Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2015

Employees' Perceptions About the Deterrence
Effect of Polygraph Examination Against Security
Compromises
Joshua Lee Cook
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Joshua Cook

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. Mark Stallo, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Mark Gordon, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Tanya Settles, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer
Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University
2015

Abstract
Employees’ Perceptions About the Deterrence Effect of Polygraph Examination
Against Security Compromises
by
Joshua L. Cook

M.Ed, Strayer University, 2006
BS, Upper Iowa University, 2001

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
December 2015

Abstract
Controversy continues over the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential
leakers as critics argue that the technique is based on faulty assumptions. The purpose of
this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine whether there was a
perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year
compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same
time period. Paternoster and Simpson’s, as well as Vance and Siponen’s, rational choice
models and Bandura’s social learning theory served as the theoretical foundation for this
study. Specifically, this study assessed groups’ perceptions about adhering to security
regulations if a polygraph is required, changes in their behavior and attitude, and beliefs
about polygraph deterrent effect. Data were obtained through a 15-minute researchercreated survey with a cluster sample of 326 participants. Data were analyzed with a t test
to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. A
factor analysis was also conducted. Results indicated that there was a statistically
significant difference (p < .001) between the groups, suggesting that participants perceive
a deterrent effect associated with the use of polygraphs as well as a change of behavior
and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work. The implications for
positive social change stemming from this study include recommendations to the nation’s
national security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of
certain security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such
strategies in order to fortify the national intelligence infrastructure.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The term, insider threats, refers to current or former employees, service providers,
or contractors who are the greatest threat to an organization’s security management due to
their possible noncompliance with security policies (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler,
& Boss, 2009; Holmlund, Mucisko, Kimberland, & Freyre, 2010; Holmlund, Mucisko,
Lynch, & Freyre, 2011; Jenkins, 2013; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010). Insider threats can
be divided into two categories: (a) nonmalicious and (b) malicious (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom
& von Solms, 2004). Nonmalicious insider threats pertain to current and former
employees, contractors, and other business partners who put their company at risk
because they did not comply with the suggested security policy due to ignorance or
nonmalicious negligence (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Examples of
nonmalicious insider threats include disclosing sensitive information in e-mails or in
conversations or visiting websites that are infected with viruses or malware (Holmlund et
al., 2010; Jenkins, 2013). On the other hand, malicious insider threats pertain to
employees, contractors, and other business partners who have authorized access to their
organization’s network, system, and data, and intentionally exceeded or misused their
access in a way that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the
organization’s information or information systems (IS; Computer Emergency Readiness
Team [CERT], 2015). Examples of malicious insider threats include stealing and
exposing sensitive information, sabotaging systems, and committing financial fraud
(Holmlund et al., 2010; Jenkins, 2013).
The health of U.S. companies is vital to the U.S. economy as the economy is a
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matter of national security (Figliuzzi, 2012). Based on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) pending case load during fiscal year 2012, Figliuzzi (2012), then
assistant director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, reported that economic
espionage losses to the U.S. economy totaled more than $13 billion (para. 1). Ponemon
Institute (2011, p. 2) found that the average time to resolve a cyber attack is 18 days,
which can cost an organization approximately $415,748. In contrast, Ponemon Institute
reported that malicious insider cyber attacks can take more than 45 days to contain.
Different techniques and strategies have been used to deter and detect insider
threats, such as human behavioral analysis techniques (e.g., polygraph examinations) and
detecting anomalies in system resource utilization (e.g., file access monitoring; Jenkins,
2013; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2012). However,
controversies still continue about the use of polygraph analysis to detect deception
(Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some supporters argue that it is highly accurate, while some
opponents argue that it is very unreliable (American Polygraph Association, 2005;
Cumming, 2009; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). The National Research Council (2003)
reported that little is known about whether polygraph screenings are effective in terms of
deterring national security crimes. Therefore, in this descriptive and exploratory research
study, I determined whether there was a perceived deterrent effect related to the use of
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a
polygraph examination within the same time period.
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The implications for positive social change are directed at the nation’s national
security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain
security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in
order to fortify the national intelligence infrastructure. In Chapter 1, I include the
background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, and research
questions and hypotheses. In addition, I include the theoretical framework, nature of the
study, operational definition of terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations,
significance of the study, and a summary.
Background of the Study
A polygraph is a device that concurrently records a series of different
physiological channels (American Polygraph Association, 2013; National Center for
Credibility Assessment [NCCA], 2013b). It originated in the late 19th century from
research into medical instruments that recorded changes in physiology under a variety of
circumstances (Landis & Gullette, 1925; National Research Council, 2003; Trovillo,
1939). When used as a screening device, questions are asked at regular timed intervals
and the physiological changes are recorded. Polygraph examiners seek trends based on
guidelines in physiological responses to certain types of questions, which often indicate
psychological concerns regarding a certain type of question (American Polygraph
Association, 2013; NCCA, 2011). The polygraph is used in a variety of settings to detect
psychophysiological elements of deception.
A screening polygraph examination is conducted as part of an employment
application process or prior to gaining access to certain special programs, such as
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operational intelligence platforms and secret military operations programs (U.S. Army,
1993, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013). Federal agencies that use the polygraph to deter
and detect unauthorized disclosures include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Energy (DOE), FBI, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and
National Security Agency (NSA; ODNI, 2012). The questions asked on a typical
screening polygraph examination are generally standardized throughout the community
that uses it (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015). Presumably, the examination is conducted
without suspicion of wrong-doing on the part of the examinee. The U.S. Government
conducts approximately 40,000 polygraph examinations every year and the majority of
the examinations are screening examinations for employment or program access
(Koerner, 2002, para. 5; National Research Council, 2003). However, the National
Research Council (2003) noted that little is known about whether polygraph screenings
are effective in terms of deterring national security crimes.
Deterrence through polygraph screening examinations typically comes in the form
of employment avoidance, behavior and attitude change, or behavior maintenance
(National Research Council, 2003). According to the National Research Council (2003),
individuals will avoid employment at locations where polygraph exams are employed or
they will deliberately change prohibited behavior or attitudes in order to comply with the
regulations (National Research Council, 2003). While there is an abundance of literature
on the reliability and validity of polygraph analysis, there is a lack of research that
examines employees’ perceptions about the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis.
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Therefore, this research study was necessary because it filled that gap and added to the
literature regarding this topic.
Statement of the Problem
The reliability of polygraph analysis for detecting deception continues to be a
controversial topic (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some supporters have argued that
polygraph analysis can detect deception with approximately 80% to 98% accuracy, while
many scientists reported that the technique detects deception at rates that are only slightly
better than chance (American Polygraph Association, 2005, p. 9; Cumming, 2009, p. 8;
Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 1). Until the passage of the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act (EPPA) of 1988, many American businesses used polygraph as a tool for
screening employees and job applicants (American Polygraph Association, 2005;
Cumming, 2009; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). However, government agencies,
contractors working with government agencies, and private-sector employees who are
suspected of theft are not exempt from polygraph testing (American Polygraph
Association, 2005; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015).
Therefore, one way that U.S. federal agencies (e.g., CIA, DIA, DOE, FBI, NGA,
NRO, and NSA) screen for insider threats is through the use of polygraph examinations
(Jenkins, 2013; ODNI, 2012). According to the ODNI (2012), Director Clapper
announced two steps to better protect sensitive information and further deter and detect
potential leakers within the Intelligence Community. This included adding a mandated
question related to unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the
counterintelligence polygraph and requesting independent investigations of selected
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unauthorized disclosure cases. However, critics of polygraph analysis asserted that the
technique is based on faulty assumption of a “Pinocchio response,” which is a specific
physiological lie response or “signature” of deception, as no evidence of such a response
has been found (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 3). Due to the continuing controversy over
the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers, a descriptive and
exploratory research study that determines whether there was a perceived deterrence
effect related to the use of polygraphs was needed. The findings of this study can be used
to assess whether other detection techniques and mitigation strategies should be used
instead.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine
whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between
a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past
year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience
was more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. Deterrence is defined as
keeping employees, who have committed or may engage in wrongdoing, out of sensitive
positions and keeping employees who are already in sensitive positions from doing
undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003). The National Research Council
(2003) noted that deterrence is different from the validity of polygraph testing because
the polygraph can be an effective deterrent even if it does not provide valid information
about deception. Employees’ perceptions of the deterrent effects of polygraph testing
were measured through the use of a 15-minute researcher-created survey.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
In order to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to
the use of polygraphs, this descriptive and exploratory research study addressed the
following research questions:
1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
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3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment)?
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
Theoretical Framework
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime,
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986)
social learning theory (SLT) served as the theoretical foundation for this study. A brief
overview of the theories is provided in this section with a more detailed explanation
provided in Chapter 2. This section is organized in the following subsections: Paternoster
and Simpson’s rational choice model, Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model, and
SLT.
Paternoster and Simpson’s Rational Choice Model
The Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime is essentially a
subjective expected utility theory (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and
Simpson (1996) reported that the model is based on two assumptions: “(1) Decisions to
offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of offending and (2) what
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are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected expectations of reward and
cost” (p. 553). The researchers related that the first assumption pertains to individuals
being at least minimally rational agents and their conduct being partly guided by the
expected consequences of their behavior. In regard to the second assumption, they noted
that an implication is made that the critical agent of corporate crime is the individual. The
researchers suggested that the decision to break the law is made by individuals; however,
these individuals are affected by the context in which they are employed and commit
their crimes. Hence, employees who commit corporate crimes are affected by the
characteristics and imperatives of their business organization. Specifically, the decisions
of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they perceive for themselves,
(b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and (c) the presence or absence
of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context of the organization.
Vance and Siponen’s Rational Choice Model
In order to better understand the effect of expected benefits on IS security
violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational
choice model as the basis for their theoretical model. Vance and Siponen reported that
rational choice theory (RCT) had not been used in the field of IS. The researchers related
that RCT explains individuals’ decisions to commit crimes as utilitarian calculations
based on perceived benefits and both formal and informal sanctions. Therefore, RCT
extends beyond deterrence theory by including individuals’ perceptions of benefits of
violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs. They noted that RCT is
commonly used to explain criminal behavior; however, it is general enough to cover all
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violations. Vance and Siponen noted that RCT is also applicable to the study of violations
of organizational IS security policies. The researchers also noted that RCT has been
found to explain white-collar crimes better than street-level crimes. Due to this and
because RCT has been found to be effective in the corporate context (e.g., Paternoster &
Simpsons, 1996), Vance and Siponen related that they expected it to be a good fit for
explaining intentional IS security policy violations, which also includes a deliberate
violation of organizational norms.
To better explain IS security policy violations in situations where employees are
aware of the IS security policy, Vance and Siponen’s (2012) theoretical model includes
disincentives (sanctions) and incentives (perceived benefits) for violating IS security
policies. In addition, their model includes both informal sanctions, which are unstated
social penalties; formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties for specific forms of
misconduct; and moral beliefs. The researchers’ RCT model includes formal sanctions,
informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits.
Social Learning Theory
Bandura (1974, 1977, 1986) developed SLT in the 1960s, which was later
changed to social cognitive theory (SCT) in 1986 (Boston University School of Public
Health, 2013). According to the Boston University School of Public Health (2013), SLT
posits that learning occurs in a social context with a three-way, dynamic, and reciprocal
interaction of the person, environment, and behavior. In this theory, focus is placed on
social influence and external and internal social reinforcement (Boston University School
of Public Health, 2013). In SLT, consideration is placed on the unique way in which
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individuals acquire and maintain behavior, while considering the social environment in
which individuals perform the behavior (Boston University School of Public Health,
2013). The theory takes into account individuals’ past experiences, which influences
reinforcement, expectations, and expectancies (Boston University School of Public
Health, 2013). All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a specific
behavior and the reasons for doing so.
SLT’s goal is to explain how individuals regulate their behavior through control
and reinforcement to achieve goal-directed behavior that can be maintained over time
(Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). Boston University School of Public
Health (2013, para. 3) discussed six constructs of SLT: (a) reciprocal determinism, (b)
behavioral capability, (c) observational learning, (d) reinforcements, (e) expectations, and
(f) self-efficacy. These constructs are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
This descriptive and exploratory research study determined whether there was a
perceived deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants
who were subjected to polygraph examination within the past year compared to those
who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. This
research design was appropriate as the goal of the research study was to determine
whether there was a statistically significant difference between the polygraph-treatment
and no polygraph-treatment groups’ perceptions of the deterrence effect of polygraph
examinations.
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The 152 participants in the polygraph-treatment group had taken the polygraph
through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in South Korea
and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group
were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens who lived and worked in
South Korea, were students from the Walden University participant pool, and individuals
from the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn. Data were obtained
through a 15-minute researcher-developed questionnaire. Data were analyzed using
SPSS, which included descriptive statistics, such as means and standard deviations. A t
test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between
the groups. In addition, a factor analysis was conducted among the 30 polygraph
questions. The nature of the study is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
Operational Definition of Terms
Counterintelligence: Information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign
persons, or international terrorist activities (NCCA, 2011).
Deterrence: “Keeping people who have done or may do certain undesired things
out of sensitive positions and keeping people already in sensitive positions from doing
undesired things” (National Research Council, 2003, p. 53).
Insider threats: Refers to current or former employees, service providers, or
contractors who are the greatest threat to an organization’s security management due to
their possible noncompliance with security policies (Boss et al., 2009; Holmlund et al.,
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2010; Holmlund et al., 2011; Jenkins, 2013; Li et al., 2010).
Intelligence: Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons
(Executive Branch, 2008; U.S. Government, 2013).
Leak: An unauthorized disclosure of controlled or classified government
information, often to the open press for publication, which is a deliberate security
compromise (Elsea, 2013).
Lie detector: “Includes a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer,
psychological stress evaluator or similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) used
to render diagnostic opinion as to the honesty of an individual” (U.S. Department of
Labor [DOL], 2008, para. 3).
Malicious insider threats: Pertains to employees, contractors, and other business
partners who have authorized access to their organization’s network, system, and data and
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a way that negatively affected the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or IS (CERT,
2015).
National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA): U.S. government’s premiere
educational center for polygraph and other credibility assessment technologies and
techniques (NCCA, 2013a). Its central mission is to assist federal agencies in the
protection of U.S. citizens, interests, infrastructure, and security by providing the best
education and tools for credibility assessment (NCCA, 2013a).
Nonmalicious insider threats: Pertains to current and former employees,
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contractors and other business partners who put their company at risk because they did
not comply with the suggested security policy due to ignorance or nonmalicious
negligence (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom & von Solms, 2004).
Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice model: Is based on two assumptions:
“(1) Decisions to offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of
offending and (2) what are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected
expectations of reward and cost” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996, p. 553).
Polygraph: “An instrument that records continuously, visually, permanently, and
simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory and electrodermal patterns as
minimum instrumentation standards and is used to render a diagnostic opinion as to the
honesty or dishonesty of an individual” (DOL, 2008, para. 3). An examinee is asked a
series of questions and the results are often used in making determinations about access
to classified information or programs, or assist in determining examinee’s involvement in
a specific issue (American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International,
2005; U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], 2006; NCCA, 2011).
Polygraph examination: A process that encompasses all activities that take place
between a polygraph examiner and an examinee during a specific series of interactions
(NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015).These interactions may include the pretest interview, the
use of the polygraph instrument to collect physiological data from the examinee while
presenting a series of tests, the test data analysis phase, and the posttest phase, which may
include the interrogation of the examinee (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015).
Polygraph examiner: Someone who has successfully completed formal education
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and training in conducting polygraph examinations and is certified by their agency to
conduct such examinations. Army Polygraph Examiners must possess at a minimum
counterintelligence special agent training, 2 years investigative experience, a bachelor’s
degree, completion of the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD) School,
and successful completion of at least 6 months as an intern (ASTM International, 2005;
NCCA, 2011).
Polygraph test: A portion of the polygraph examination, often called the in-test, in
which a series of questions are administered, with a polygraph instrument collecting
physiological information from an examinee, and an analysis is conducted in an effort to
determine the likelihood of guilt or innocence (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015).
Relevant questions: Questions used during a polygraph that are intended to be the
focus of the polygraph. Examples of relevant questions are: Have you committed
espionage against the United States and did you stab that person? (NCCA, 2011; Nelson,
2015)
Screening exam: A multiple relevant issue polygraph test that is given to a
population without any specific accusation (NCCA, 2011; National Research Council,
2003; Nelson, 2015).
Social learning theory (SLT): SLT posits that learning occurs in a social context
with a three-way, dynamic, and reciprocal interaction of the person, environment, and
behavior (Boston University School of Public Health, 2013).
U.S. Intelligence Community: Coalition of 17 agencies and organizations within
the executive branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather the
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intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities (ODNI,
2015b).
Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model: Explains individuals’ decisions to
commit crimes as utilitarian calculations based on perceived benefits and both formal and
informal sanctions (Vance & Siponen, 2012). It also includes individuals’ perceptions of
benefits of violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs (Vance &
Siponen, 2012). Thus, their model includes formal sanctions, informal sanctions, moral
beliefs, and perceived benefits (Vance & Siponen, 2012).
Assumptions
Assumptions made for this study were:


The 15-minute researcher-created questionnaire was appropriate for assessing the
perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs among the two
groups.



The survey was worded so that the participants could accurately interpret the
information being asked and the participants provided their honest perceptions.



The individuals who were recruited and received the hard copy consent form and
the survey link were the ones who completed the survey.



The surveys accurately measured what they are intended to measure.



Employees were willing to take part in the study because of its significance.



The results of the study will lead to positive social change by further enforcing
polygraph examinations and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of
such strategies.
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Scope and Delimitations
The study only focused on the perceived deterrence effect related to the use of
polygraphs. It did not focus on the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph
examinations. The study applied to employees who are U.S. citizens and resident aliens
in the United States and South Korea. Employees in the polygraph-treatment group had
taken the polygraph within the past year through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. Employees in the
no polygraph-treatment group were individuals who had not taken a screening polygraph
examination in the last year and who were not required to take a polygraph as part of
their job requirements. They were nonintelligence personnel who lived in South Korea,
students from the Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden
University online community site, LinkedIn. Excluded were individuals under the age of
18 and individuals who had pending polygraph examinations with me in order to prevent
a possible conflict of interest or perceived quid pro quo bias.
Limitations
This study had several limitations. First, this study determined the perceived
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between two groups; therefore, the study
remained distinct in its focus and limited in its scope. This study was not designed to
answer questions related to the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph
examinations. Although these topics may be important to public policy and the
administration field, the psychology field, and the intelligence community, they were not
the focus of this research effort.
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A second possible limitation of the study includes generalizing the results since a
cluster sampling of 326 participants, all of whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident
aliens located in South Korea and the United States, was used and the results of the study
are limited to similar populations of employees. The 152 participants in the polygraphtreatment group had taken the polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174
participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and
legal resident aliens who lived and worked in South Korea, were students from the
Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden University online
community site, LinkedIn. These employees’ unique perceptions may not be
generalizable to other populations.
Third, I used a 15-minute researcher-developed survey, which has not been used
in past studies. However, a pilot study was conducted on the survey prior to using it in
the main study. In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from
two agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure
consistency with community standards. In addition, the survey was found to have very
high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90).
Fourth, selection or sampling bias was another limitation of the study. In regard to
selection bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received
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their screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment.
However, participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections
between the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any
preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Future
research could exclude participants who have taken a polygraph from the researcher. In
addition, changes to the populations could be made in future research, where more
similar populations are compared. Specifically, two similar groups of participants who
work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within
the last year against those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the
experience was more than a year prior, could be compared and the results compared to
the findings found in this study.
A fifth limitation was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias could have resulted in
a low response rate on the survey and a decrease in the sample size, which could also
affect the generalizability of the data. Some surveys could not be used as some
participants did not complete all the questions. However, there was enough participation
to meet the sample size needed, where 300 participants was the minimum and 326
individuals participated in the study.
A sixth limitation was self-report or social desirability bias. Self-report or social
desirability bias has to be considered as participants may want to be perceived positively
so they may not respond honestly. In addition, there are problems inherent with selfreport data as participants may not accurately or fully self-evaluate themselves. In order
to address this bias, the Likert scale format was used, which did not allow participants the
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freedom to include additional information that they may have felt was important. In
addition, it was assumed that participants answered honestly to the questions asked on the
survey.
Significance of the Study
While there is an abundance of literature on the reliability and validity of
polygraph analysis, this research study added to the literature and advanced knowledge
by filling a gap in the public policy and administration literature with respect to
employees’ perceptions about the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis. Findings from
this study are beneficial not only to the public policy and administration field, but to a
wide array of other fields, including the fields of psychology and intelligence. The
findings from the study are also applicable to many agencies and organizations, to
include the DOD and the coalition of 17 agencies and organizations that are a part of the
U.S. Intelligence Community including the ODNI, Army Intelligence, FBI, and CIA.
The findings from this study also advanced practice and policy. Based on these
findings, there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between
the two groups. Employees in sensitive positions who face random polygraph testing may
take greater care to avoid even minor security infractions in order to avoid the possibility
of a future deceptive reading on a polygraph test. One of the goals of polygraph testing is
deterrence, which means keeping employees, who have committed or may engage in
wrongdoing, out of sensitive positions and keeping employees who are already in
sensitive positions from doing undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003).
The findings of Research Question 2 that random polygraph testing may result in a
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change of behavior and attitude is significant as it may deter actions that threaten national
interests based on the perceived likelihood and consequences of detection. Therefore, the
implications for positive social change stemming from these findings include
recommendations to the nation’s national security agencies to continue enforcing the
polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the
possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national
intelligence infrastructure.
Summary
The focus of this study was on whether there was a perceived deterrent effect
related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a
polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced
a polygraph examination within the same time period. Data were collected through the
use of a 15-minute researcher-created questionnaire with 326 volunteer participants, all of
whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident aliens located in South Korea and the United
States. Data were analyzed using SPSS and data analysis included the use of descriptive
statistics, a t test, and a factor analysis. Findings from this study may advance practice
and policy by further encouraging policymakers and the nation’s national security
agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain security
personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to
fortify the national intelligence infrastructure.
In Chapter 1, I included the introduction, background of the study, statement of
the problem, purpose of the study, research questions and hypotheses, theoretical
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framework, nature of the study, operational definition of terms, assumptions, scope and
delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a summary. In Chapter 2, I
include the introduction, literature search strategy, theoretical foundation, background of
polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, polygraph as a deterrent
against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on employees’ behavior and attitudes,
adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and a summary and conclusions. In
Chapter 3, I include the introduction, research design and rationale, methodology, data
analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I include the introduction,
pilot study, data collection and study results, and a summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5,
I include the introduction, interpretation of findings, limitations of the study,
recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this descriptive and exploratory research study, I determined whether there was
a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year
compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience was
more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. Controversy over the use of
polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers continues (National Research
Council, 2003; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some polygraph proponents claim that the
polygraph technique is highly accurate and can detect deception with approximately 95%
accuracy (American Polygraph Association, 2005, p. 5; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 1).
However, some scientists argue that the polygraph technique only detects deception at a
rate that is slightly better than chance (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015).
As the FBI’s economic caseload increases, so does the percentage of cases that
are attributed to insider threats, where current or former trusted employees, contractors,
and other business partners are a growing part of the problem (Figliuzzi, 2012). Figliuzzi
(2012) highlighted a 2012 indictment, where several former employees who had more
than 70 combined years of service working for a company were convicted of selling trade
secrets on the production of titanium dioxide to a competitor in China. Figliuizzi
emphasized that this case was one of the largest economic espionage cases in the FBI’s
history. In Chapter 2, I include the literature search strategy, theoretical foundation,
background of polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, polygraph
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as a deterrent against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on employees’ behavior
and attitudes, adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and a summary and
conclusions.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature search included an in-depth search in Walden University Library
research databases, including all EBSCOhost databases and ProQuest. Databases
included ProQuest Criminal Justice, Political Science Complete, Political Science
Complete, Oxford Criminology Bibliographies, International Security and Counter
Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, PsycINFO, and
PsycARTICLES. Organizational websites were also searched such as Secrecy News
found on the Federation of American Scientists website. Search terms included
deception, polygraph, lie detection, detection of deception, polygraph and employees,
polygraph and deterrence effect, polygraph and behavior and attitude, social learning
theory, rational choice theory, deterrence theory, deterrence, and crime prevention
through deterrence.
Theoretical Foundation
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime,
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986)
SLT can be used to understand deterrence effects in the workplace. I discussed the
theoretical propositions of the theories and how they have been applied previously in
ways similar to this study. This section is organized in the following subsections: rational
choice theory and social learning theory.
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Rational Choice Theory
In this subsection, I discussed Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice
model. In addition, I discussed Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model. It is
organized in the following areas: overview, Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice
model, Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model, and research application of rational
choice theory.
Overview. Numerous theorists have been credited with establishing RCT, such as
Homans (1961), who created a basic framework of exchange theory by using
assumptions drawn from behaviorist psychology (Scott, 2000). However, other theorists,
such as Blau (1964), Coleman (1973), and Cook (1977), have expanded on Homans’s
framework, and developed more formal, mathematical models of RCT (Scott, 2000). In
addition, Li et al. (2010) reported that Becker (1968) originally developed RCT with the
premise that offenders weigh the costs and benefits in deciding whether to offend. The
researchers noted that Becker’s premise has been adapted to various contexts to explain
deviant behavior and that Paternoster and Simpson (1996) further refined the theory to
explain corporate crimes or deviant behaviors in the workplace.
Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice model. RCT has been found to be
useful in understanding corporate crime or deviant behaviors in the workplace because
both corporate crime and corporate offenders are thought to be particularly amenable to
sanction threats (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). As a result, Paternoster and Simpson
(1996) related that they extended the rational choice model to study employees’ deviant
behaviors in the workplace. The researchers argued that past research has generally
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focused on the deterrent effect of formal sanction threats, but the relevance of other
potential costs of offending such as loss of occupational position, social censure, personal
embarrassment, and shame, have not been explicitly included in a comprehensive test of
RCT of corporate crime. The researchers argued that a more comprehensive empirical
test of corporate crime that explicitly considers the complete range of available sanctions
and rewards of corporate offending, as well as the notion of self-censure and morality
was needed. Subsequently, Paternoster and Simpson noted that they developed a rational
choice model of corporate crime based in part on Becker’s (1968) neoclassical economic
theories of crime.
The Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime is essentially a
subjective expected utility theory (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and
Simpson (1996) reported that the model is based on two assumptions: “(1) Decisions to
offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of offending and (2) what
are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected expectations of reward and
cost” (p. 553). The researchers related that the first assumption pertains to individuals
being at least minimally rational agents and that their conduct is partly guided by the
expected consequences of their behavior. In regard to the second assumption, the
researchers noted that an implication made is that the critical agent of corporate crime is
the individual. The researchers suggested that the decision to break the law is made by
individuals; however, these individuals are affected by the context in which they are
employed and commit their crimes. Hence, employees who commit corporate crimes are
affected by the characteristics and imperatives of their business organization.
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Specifically, the decisions of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they
perceive for themselves, (b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and
(c) the presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific
context of the organization.
The exact form that costs and benefits of corporate crime may take varies
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued that the
company’s cost could include regulatory, civil, and criminal sanctions; reduced revenue;
decreased ability to compete against foreign competitors; or a decrease in the company’s
prestige. The company’s benefit could include increased revenues and prestige and the
opportunity to challenge the perceived unnecessary regulation or law. On an individual
level, the cost of corporate crime also includes the possibility of formal legal sanction
such as civil or criminal sanctions; reduced prestige of the organization where the
individual works; loss of self-respect; and social censure from colleagues, family, and
friends. The benefits on an individual level would include career advancement and an
increase in personal income. Therefore, what is beneficial and costly to the company is
also beneficial and costly to employees.
Furthermore, in additional to instrumental concerns, employees’ decisions to
commit corporate crime may be affected by normative factors such as their moral
evaluation of the act (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). According to Paternoster and
Simpson (1996), employees may be restrained by moral inhibitions; therefore, some acts
of corporate crime are not committed because they are believed to be wrong. The
researchers discussed how normative restraints fit into the neoclassical rational choice
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model from their perspective. First, the researchers related that norms act as constraints
on employee decision makers, restricting the range of available choices. Second, the
researchers view this restraint as noninstrumental; therefore, moral inhibitions are not
based on the consequences of employees’ behavior. Employees do not behave a certain
way because of the expected outcomes or because it is expected of others; instead, moral
rules are internalized.
Subsequently, certain acts are not committed because it is believed to be morally
correct not to commit them (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and Simpson
(1996) drew two implications from this for the role of moral evaluations in conduct. First,
the researchers reported that employees’ moral beliefs restrain conduct that is deemed to
be impressible independent of considerations of cost and benefit. Therefore, Paternoster
and Simpson noted that moral considerations play a significant independent role in
maintaining conforming conduct. Second, moral considerations should condition the
impact of instrumental ones. Specifically, the researchers argued that considerations of
cost and benefit do not affect those acts already strongly inhibited by notions of morality.
Paternoster and Simpson reasoned that employees’ moral sentiments expressly set some
behaviors off limits, making them taboo. The taboos are observed due to moral duty and
not subject to calculations of utility.
Employees’ decisions to commit corporate crime may be affected by the context
or circumstances of the organization (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and
Simpson (1996) suggested that employees may be more apt to commit corporate crime if
they perceive the company is losing its competitive edge, suspect the overall economic
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health of the organization is declining, or the moral climate of the organization tolerates
or encourages such misconduct. However, the researchers noted that employees may be
dissuaded from offending if the organization or a staff member has recently been
sanctioned for similar conduct or the company has organizational restraints such as an
ethics hotline.
In testing their proposed rational choice model of corporate crime, Paternoster and
Simpson (1996, pp. 555-556) discussed the subjective rewards and costs of corporate
criminal conduct as perceived by individual decision makers, which include the
following:
1. Formal sanction threats: Directed against the company and employees.
2. Informal sanction threats: Directed against the company and employees.
3. Self-imposed punishment: Shame.
4. The perceived benefits of noncompliance: For the company and employees.
In addition, each employees’ personal stock of moral beliefs about specific forms
of corporate crime also needs to be assessed (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster
and Simpson (1996) also noted that consideration should be given to the context of the
organization, its competitive status, its moral climate, and its previous experience with
corporate or employee sanctions for misconduct. In summary, the researchers argued that
intention to commit corporate crime is a function of the following factors (Paternoster &
Simpson, 1996, p. 556):
1. Perceived benefits of the action for oneself.
2. Perceived formal and informal sanctions directed against oneself.
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3. Feelings of shame or self-imposed punishment.
4. Moral inhibitions against committing the act.
5. Perceived benefits of the action for the organization.
6. Perceived formal and informal sanctions directed against the organization.
7. Perceived loss of prestige for the organization.
8. The organizational context of the company.
9. Characteristics of the organization.
Data in Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996, p. 557) study were collected from 84
business students who were potentially at risk for committing corporate crime and 12
executives who were currently at risk for such crime. However, the total sample size was
noted to be 384 because each person read and responded to four different scenarios where
they described the commission of corporate crime (96 × 4 = 384; Paternoster & Simpson,
1996, p. 557). The researchers found considerable support for a rational choice model
that included an appeal to both rationality and morality. Findings indicated that intentions
to commit four types of corporate crime were affected by formal and informal sanction
threats, moral evaluations, and organizational factors (CITE). Based on their findings,
Paternoster and Simpson suggested a number of alternative but compatible strategies for
dealing with corporate crime. First, they found that enforcement efforts directed at the
business organization act as a powerful deterrent for those who make decisions within the
organization. Second, they found that enforcement efforts that are directly targeted at the
individual decision maker also serve as an effective deterrent to corporate crime. Hence,
threats of criminal and civil sanctions directed against the individual inhibited the
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intention to commit corporate crime as well as the fear of informal sanctions. Third, the
researchers found evidence to suggest that moral appeals may be an especially powerful
source of corporate social control. As a result, strengthening the business ethics of
corporate managers may prove to be a very effective crime-control strategy since moral
inhibitions were found to be a very strong safeguard against corporate crime.
Based on their research findings, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued for a
multifaceted approach to crime control. The researchers related that one part of this
approach would be the moral education of those engaged in business. They also argued
for a legalistic approach to corporate crime control through the enforcement of business
laws and regulations. The researchers claimed that an appeal to legal sanction is
necessary because findings indicated that an appeal to morality does not work for
everyone. Therefore, when morality weakens, legal threats must be used to secure
compliance. In addition, the threat of legal sanctions may be necessary to maintain the
legitimacy of an extensive network of informal and normative controls. The researchers
found that legal sanctions directed at the organization are a significant factor in
supporting employees’ beliefs that corporate crime is wrong, shame occurs if one were to
commit it, and in strengthening the credibility of legal sanctions for employees. The
researchers contended that theoretical models of corporate crime and public policy efforts
must contain instrumental (threats of punishment) and deontological (appeals to morality)
factors.
Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model. In order to better understand the
effect of expected benefits on IS security violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used
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Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model as the basis for their theoretical
model. Vance and Siponen reported that RCT had not been used in the field of IS. The
researchers related that RCT explains individuals’ decisions to commit crimes as
utilitarian calculations based on perceived benefits and both formal and informal
sanctions. Therefore, RCT extends beyond deterrence theory by including individuals’
perceptions of benefits of violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs.
They noted that RCT is commonly used to explain criminal behavior; however, it is
general enough to cover all violations. Vance and Siponen noted that RCT is also
applicable to the study of violations of organizational IS security policies. The
researchers also noted that RCT has been found to explain white-collar crimes better than
street-level crimes. Due to this and because RCT has been found to be effective in the
corporate context (e.g., Paternoster & Simpsons, 1996), Vance and Siponen related that
they expected it to be a good fit for explaining intentional IS security policy violations,
which also includes a deliberate violation of organizational norms.
To better explain IS security policy violations in situations where employees are
aware of the IS security policy, Vance and Siponen’s (2012) theoretical model includes
disincentives (sanctions) and incentives (perceived benefits) for violating IS security
policies. In addition, their model includes both informal sanctions, which are unstated
social penalties; formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties for specific forms of
misconduct; and moral beliefs. The researchers’ RCT model includes formal sanctions,
informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits.
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In regard to formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties imposed for specific
forms of misconduct, researchers found that the severity of the formal sanctions had a
significant effect on users’ intentions to commit computer abuses (e.g., D’Arcy, Hovav,
& Galletta, 2009; Straub, 1990). Due to this theoretical and empirical support, Vance and
Siponen (2012) hypothesized that “formal sanctions negatively affect intention to violate
IS security policy” (p. 25). Examples of informal sanctions (unstated social penalties for
undesirable behavior), include disapproval from friends or peers, social censure, or
embarrassment (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990;
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Vance and Siponen reported that depending on the type of
offense, empirical findings regarding the effects of informal sanctions have been mixed.
Therefore, the researchers hypothesized that “informal sanctions negatively affect
intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 25).
Moral belief is another element of Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice
model. Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) suggested that the traditional views of
RCT do not take into account the moral beliefs of individuals. Bachman et al. posited that
individuals may refrain from offending not because they fear sanctions but because they
evaluate the offense as morally wrong. The researchers discussed two possible reasons
for this, which are as follows: (a) Individuals’ moral beliefs are so strong that other
factors are irrelevant and (b) when moral beliefs are not strongly held, formal sanctions
are then needed. Of these two components, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that
moral inhibitions are the strongest predictor of corporate crime, which is supported by
other research findings (e.g., Bachman et al., 1992; Ellis & Simpson, 1995). Vance and
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Siponen claimed that moral beliefs are relevant to the context of information security
because choices generally pertaining to information security and choices specifically
pertaining to security policies involve a moral component (see Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila,
Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009; Stahl, 2004). Vance and Siponen hypothesized that “moral
beliefs negatively affect intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 26).
Findings from empirical studies have supported the notion that perceived benefits
positively affect decisions to commit violations (e.g., Ducan, Lafree, & Piquero, 2005;
Puhakainen, 2006; Wood, Gove, Wilson, & Cochran, 1997). Perceived benefits might be
intrinsic such as the excitement some individuals may experience when committing a
crime or extrinsic such as money (Ducan, Lafree, & Piquero, 2005; Puhakainen, 2006;
Wood, Gove, Wilson, & Cochran, 1997). Puhakainen (2006) found that time saving is a
major incentive to violate or avoid IS security policies. Vance and Siponen hypothesized
that “perceived benefits positively affect intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 26).
To examine IS security policy violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used a
hypothetical scenario method. Data were collected from a high-tech services company
and a major bank, both of which handled sensitive information. Both organizations were
chosen because they used IS security policies and had clear sanctions in place for policy
violations. Findings indicated that moral beliefs are an important predictor of intention to
violate IS security policies, which is consistent with findings from previous research
(e.g., Bachman et al., 1992; D’Archy et al., 2009; Elis & Simpson, 1995; Paternoster &
Simpson, 1996; Siponen, 2000, 2002). Vance and Siponen’s interpretation of this finding
is that if employees view violations of IS security policies as morally wrong, they are less
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likely to commit them. On the other hand, if employees believe that it is morally
acceptable to violate the norm, then they are more likely to do so.
A second finding in Vance and Siponen’s (2012) study indicated that perceived
benefits also had a significant positive effect on intention, but the direction was opposite
that of moral beliefs. Based on this finding, the researchers suggested that if employees
see a benefit in violating IS security policy, then they are more likely to do so. As a
result, they noted that mangers should take into account potential benefits that may
prompt noncompliance, such as saving time. Thus, security managers may use IS security
training to address the potential benefit of saving time, which may be perceived as a
reason for policy violations.
A third finding was that the effect of formal sanctions was not supported (Vance
& Siponen, 2012). Vance and Siponen (2012) noted that research pertaining to sanctions
in the IS field are mixed. For example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that only the severity
of formal sanctions effectively reduced IS misuse. In contrast, Hu, Xu, Dinev, and Ling
(2010) found that formal sanctions had a small effect on employee intentions to commit
computer offenses. A fourth finding was that the effect of informal sanctions was not
supported; however, a small, significant effect (p < .10) was detected (Xu et al., 2010.
30). In regard to the interpretation of the formal sanctions and informal sanctions
findings, the researchers argued that formal sanctions such as penalties and informal
sanctions such as the loss of respect from management and coworkers, do not work as
deterrents in the context of employees’ compliance with IS security procedures. In regard
to informal sanctions, the researchers related that employees do not care about penalties
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and the loss of respect because they perceive penalties and lack of respect to be minor
issues. Vance and Siponen also noted another possible interpretation related to
Kohlberg’s (1976, 1984) cognitive theory of moral development, which suggests that
only individuals who are in the initial stages of moral development are influenced by
sanctions.
In summary, moral beliefs, perceived benefits, and informal sanctions showed
significant effects in explaining employee IS security policy violations (Vance &
Siponen, 2012). In contrast, the effect of formal sanctions was insignificant (Vance &
Siponen, 2012). Based on their findings, Vance and Siponen (2012) suggested that
organizations should include other means to discourage IS security violations apart from
formal sanctions because they are not always effective in deterring policy violations.
Hence, in addition to formal sanctions, the researchers recommended that security
managers engage in positive means of reinforcement, such as arranging IS security
training sessions in order to persuade employees that the violation of IS security policies
is morally wrong and compliance with policies is morally right. In regard to perceived
benefits of violating IS security policies, the researchers suggested that top management
and supervisors communicate clear and consistent message that saving work time does
not justify the violation of IS security policies. Thus, adhering to IS security policies is
important to employee job descriptions and responsibilities.
Research application of rational choice theory. Along with the benefits
associated with the use of Internet technology in the workplace, threats such as increased
security risks and improper use are major concerns for most companies (Li et al., 2010).
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Li et al. (2010) reported that nonwork-related Internet activities, such as checking
personal e-mails, browsing nonwork-related websites, chatting online, gaming, investing,
shopping, and cybercrimes, reduces employees’ productivity and can cause various
security breaches such as viruses and spyware. Despite companies adopting and
implementing Internet use policies (IUPs) to reduce employees’ Internet misuse, the
scope of Internet misuse is still on the rise due to noncompliance (Foster, 2006). Young
and Case (2004) found that of the 25 companies that implemented IUPs, 40% found the
policies to be an effective deterrent to curb employee Internet abuse, 40% did not find the
policies effective, and 20% did not respond (p. 108). Of the 10 companies that used
management training, 40% found it to be an effective deterrent, while 50% found it
ineffective, and 10% did not respond (Young & Case, 2004, p. 108). Rehabilitation
training was found to be effective by one company that used it as a way to deal with
employee Internet abuse.
Prior to 2010, there was a lack of studies that provided full insight into why
noncompliance with security policies occur because researchers ignored the effect of
perceived benefits of deviant behaviors, moral values, and the conditions for formal
sanctions to be effective (Li et al., 2010). As a result, Li et al. (2010) reported that they
applied Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime to
examine how employees’ intention to comply with IUP is driven by cost-benefit
assessments, personal norms, and organizational context factors. Li et al. examined their
research model, where they suggested that employees’ IUP compliance intention will
increase when (a) “employees perceive high threats from formal or informal sanctions or
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high security risks to their computer or data and (b) employees have high personal norms
against Internet abuses” (p. 637). In addition, based on their model, personal norms
against Internet abuses can be increased by the joint effect of organizational norms and
organizational identification.
Participants in Li et al. (2010) study were organizational employees and 246
usable responses were received from the online survey (p. 639). Li et al. (2010) reported
that their findings were consistent with Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice
model of corporate crime. Findings indicated that employees’ intention to comply with
the IUP involves a cost-benefit analysis. The researchers found that employees were
more likely to comply with the IUP when perceived benefits were overridden by potential
risks from formal sanctions and security threats. The deterrence effect of formal sanction
risks was largely exerted through detection probability instead of sanction severity. Thus,
sanction severity was not an effective deterrence mechanism for the majority of
employees. In addition, the social influence from others who are important or subjective
norms was not a significant predictor for the intention to comply with the IUP.
Furthermore, findings indicated that along with the cost-benefit analysis,
compliance intention is also influenced by employees’ personal norms or moral standards
against Internet abuses (Li et al., 2010). Li et al. (2010) related that personal norms
moderate the effect of perceived sanction severity on the compliance intention. Perceived
sanction severity was found to be a significant deterrence mechanism only for employees
with very low personal norms against Internet abuses. For employees with moderate to
high personal norms, the perception of harsh sanctions failed to increase their compliance
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intention and also reduced it. Harsh sanctions may undermine the trust or loyalty toward
a company and create a counterproductive effect on the compliance intention among
those with moderate to high personal norms against Internet abuses. In addition, the
researchers found that organizational context factors could indirectly influence individual
employees’ compliance intention. Overall, results indicated that employees’ compliance
intention was the result of competing influences of perceived benefits, formal sanctions,
and security risks. Moreover, the effect of sanction severity was found to be moderated
by personal norms.
Findings from Li et al. (2010) study also indicated that employees conduct
Internet abuses due to the perceived benefits, such as a more interesting work life. Li et
al. (2010) noted that it may not be possible to use a zero Internet usage policy for
personal purposes in the workplace as it could decrease employees’ trust and morale and
increase enforcement cost. Instead, the researchers recommended the use of a fair IUP
with a clause that says “reasonable use” (p. 644). The researchers also recommended that
companies use several approaches to ensure employees’ IUP compliance. Thus,
companies could increase personal moral norms against Internet abuses by cultivating
voluntary compliance with security policies. Companies could further promote voluntary
policy compliance though periodic security training, educating employees about risks
from Internet security breaches. Companies could also implement various control
mechanisms to monitor the usage of the Internet and inform employees that they could be
caught if they abuse their Internet access. Hence, the sanction-based mechanism could be
used to complement the voluntary compliance approach. Furthermore, the researchers
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noted that companies could work to increase employees’ organizational identification or
their sense of belonging to the company so that employees are more likely to act in the
company’s interest and follow the IUP.
Social Learning Theory
In this subsection, I discussed the theoretical propositions of Bandura’s (1974,
1977, 1986) SLT. In addition, I discussed how the theory has been applied previously in
ways similar to this study. This subsection is organized in the following areas: theory and
research application of social learning theory.
Theory. Bandura (1974, 1977, 1986) developed SLT in the 1960s, which was
later changed to SCT in 1986 (Boston University School of Public Health, 2013).
According to Boston University School of Public Health (2013), SLT posits that learning
occurs in a social context with a three-way, dynamic and reciprocal interaction of the
person, environment, and behavior. In this theory, focus is placed on social influence and
external and internal social reinforcement. In SLT, consideration is placed on the unique
way in which individuals acquire and maintain behavior, while considering the social
environment in which individuals perform the behavior. The theory takes into account
individuals’ past experiences, which influences reinforcement, expectations, and
expectancies. All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a specific
behavior and the reasons for doing so.
SLT’s goal is to explain how individuals regulate their behavior through control
and reinforcement to achieve goal-directed behavior that can be maintained over time
(Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). Boston University School of Public
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Health (2013, para. 3) discussed six constructs, where Bandura developed the first five as
part of SLT and the sixth construct known as self-efficacy was added when the theory
evolved into SCT:
1. Reciprocal determinism: This is the theory’s central construct and pertains to
the dynamic and reciprocal interaction of person (an individual with a set of
learned experiences), environment (external social context), and behavior
(responses to stimuli to achieve goals).
2. Behavioral capability: This construct pertains to individuals’ ability to
perform a behavior through essential knowledge and skills. They learn from
the consequences of their behavior, which affects their environment.
3. Observational learning: In regard to this construct, individuals can witness and
observe a behavior that is conducted by others and then reproduce those
actions; thus, modeling the behavior.
4. Reinforcements: This construct has the greatest ties to the reciprocal
relationship between behavior and environment. It pertains to the internal or
external responses of people’s behaviors that affect whether they will continue
or discontinue the behavior. Individuals may self-initiate the reinforcement or
it may be from the environment, which may also be positive or negative.
5. Expectations: This pertains to the anticipated consequences of individuals’
behaviors. Individuals anticipate the consequences of their actions before they
engage in the behavior and these anticipated consequence influence the
successful completion of the behavior.
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6. Self-efficacy: This construct is influenced by individuals’ confidence in their
ability to successful perform a behavior. Self-efficacy is influenced by
people’s specific capabilities, other individual factors, and environmental
factors such as barriers and facilitators.
Therefore, in contrast to other learning theories, SLT emphasizes reciprocal
relationship between social characteristics of the environment, how individuals perceive
them, and how motivated and able individuals are to reproduce behaviors they see
occurring around them (Health Communication Capacity Collaboration, 2015). In
summary, Health Communication Capacity Collaboration (2015) related that in regard to
SLT, people learn by observing what others do, consider the consequences that others
experienced, rehearse (mentally first) what might happen in their own lives if they
followed other’s behavior, take action by trying the behavior, compare their experiences
with what happened to others, and confirm their belief in the new behavior.
Research application of social learning theory. The relationship between
deterrence and SLT has been discussed on numerous occasions by Akers (1977, 1985,
1990). According to Akers (1990), empirical tests of SLT have included measures of both
formal deterrence (perceived probability of being caught by police officers) and informal
parental deterrence (perceived probability of being caught by parents). Akers noted that
the term deterrence is used because the measures referred only to perception of the
likelihood of punishment. The author noted that neither formal deterrence nor informal
parental deterrence have much direct effect because each pertain to variation in perceived
likelihood of aversive consequences. Therefore, other variables that measure both reward
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and aversive consequences and the balance of positive and negative reactions from peers
and parents have strong effects. The behavioral formula in SLT includes both positive
and negative punishment and reinforcement. In addition, it includes schedules of
reinforcement, imitation, associations, normative definitions such as attitudes and
rationalization, discriminative stimuli, and other variables in criminal and conforming
behavior.
Using SLT as their theoretical foundation, Yiu, Xu, and Wan (2014) extended
corporate financial fraud research by developing a new perspective on the deterrence
effects of vicarious punishments. The researchers posited that employees vicariously
learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental
cues, and social cues in the inhibitive learning process; thus, becoming deterred from
committing future fraudulent acts. The researchers used a matched sample of 604 listed
companies between 2002 and 2008. Findings showed that an observing employee was
deterred from committing fraud if peers in the industry were caught and punished.
Furthermore, such deterrence effects are dependent on how observing employees
evaluate the possibility of being caught and the likelihood that they will be similarly
punished if they violate similar prohibitions. In particular, the researchers found that
inhibitive learning effects were positively moderated by punishments of prominent
employees and model-observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development
of the legal system. The researchers’ study illuminated the indirect, inhibitive learning
process from vicarious punishments and identified the conditions for differential learning
and deterrence outcomes of the observing employees.
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Background of Polygraph Testing
Advancements in medical understanding of human physiology and advances in
the field of psychology led to combining a number of measurable physiological reactions
on a single sheet of paper, which became known as the polygraph (Kleinmuntz &
Szucko, 2004). The term polygraph originally meant many writings but now represents a
specific field that operates at the confluence of psychology and human physiology
(American Polygraph Association, 2013; National Research Council, 2003; Nelson,
2015). According to the NCCA (2013b), the term most commonly applied to polygraph is
psychophysiological detection of deception. The term polygraph originated with the
multiple physiological reactions recorded on a single medium. Originally the medium
was paper, but with the introduction of computers, a file with graphically represented
physiology similar to what would be recorded on paper, along with other pertinent file
details, is now standard (Handler & Nelson, 2015; NCCA, 2013b).
Marston and Reid were significant figures in the evolution of the polygraph test
and expanded the use of polygraph testing within the federal government (Bunn, 1997;
National Research Council, 2003). Marston developed interview and physiology
collection techniques (Bunn, 1997; National Research Council, 2003). Specifically,
Marston invented the discontinuous polygraph, which records physiological signals only
at select times during an interrogation (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and
Lilienfeld (2015) reported that Moulton claimed that the polygraph was the solution to
detecting deception during interrogation. The researchers noted that in 1921, Larson built
on Marston’s invention and created the continuous polygraph called cardio-pneumo-
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psychograph. However, in contrast to Marston, Larson was critical of the polygraph and
cautioned against its use in court proceedings. In line with Larson’s viewpoint, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided in Frye v. United States (1923) that there was insufficient
scientific support to allow polygraph results to be used as evidence in court proceedings.
In response to the Frye ruling, scientists worked towards developing scientifically
validated polygraph techniques (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). In 1930, Larson’s associate,
Keeler, and Reid who was a major proponent of law enforcement’s use of polygraph
testing, assisted in forming the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern
University (Bunn, 1997; National Research Council, 2003; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015).
In 1938, Keeler opened the first polygraph training school and in 1947, Reid opened John
E. Reid and Associates (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). These two schools became the most
prominent U.S. polygraphy schools (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015).
Although most polygraphs measure similar physiological indicators, polygraphers
use different interrogation techniques (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and Lilienfeld
(2015) related that the three most commonly used methods of interrogation are the
irrelevant/relevant (I/R) test, the control question test (CQT), and the guilty knowledge
test (GKT). The researchers noted that the I/R test was the original method of
interrogation and this method is still commonly used by employers during personnel
screening interviews. Sylvers and Lilienfeld reported that the I/R test uses a combination
of task-irrelevant and task-relevant questions. The CQT is a variant of the I/R test and is
currently the method that is most commonly used in the United States (Sylvers &
Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and Lilienfeld noted that this method uses a combination of
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control, task-relevant, and task-irrelevant questions. The GKT technique is used to
investigate criminal guilt without attempting to identify a lie response; therefore, it is a
sharp contrast from the I/R test and CQT. Polygraphers use the GKT to assess concealing
knowledge by asking specific questions about the crime followed by multiple choice
options. The researchers noted that U.S. law enforcement agencies rarely use the GKT.
The polygraph examination generally relies on a structured interview, a thorough
review of questions to be asked, a collection of physiological responses to those questions
in a structured format, and if necessary, a postexamination interview (American
Polygraph Association, 2013; Nelson, 2015). There has been minimal change to the
actual physiological collection aspect of polygraphy since the U.S. Government began
using the polygraph as an investigative tool in the 1950s (American Polygraph
Association, 2013; Nelson, 2015). The four general physiological channels that are
recorded are breathing, cardio activity, electrodermal conductance, and movement
(American Polygraph Association, 2013; Handler & Nelson, 2015; Nelson, 2015). A
structured series of questions are asked, which are recorded on a computer, and the
examiner evaluates the physiological reactions to the various questions (American
Polygraph Association, 2013; Handler & Nelson, 2015; Nelson, 2015)..
The methods used in polygraphy have been extensively researched similar to
other commonly accepted forensic investigative techniques, such as hand writing
analysis, witness line-ups, and crime scene evidence collection (Cochrane, Tett, &
Vandecreek, 2003; National Research Council, 2003). Currently, polygraph examinations
are mainly used in law enforcement and the U.S. Intelligence Community (Executive
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Branch, 2008; NCCA, 2011; National Research Council, 2003; ODNI, 2015a). The major
uses for the polygraph exam in the U.S. are for pre-employment screening, sensitive
program access screening for current employees, and specific issue exams for resolving
issues such as crimes (DOD, 1984; Handler & Nelson, 2015; ODNI, 2015a). Reliability
rates vary depending on whether or not the exam is a multiple issue exam or a specific
issue exam (DOD, 1984; Handler & Nelson, 2015; ODNI, 2015a). Resolution rates, when
inconclusive calls are excluded, are well over chance, often approaching 85% to 95% or
higher when a conclusive result is reached (Gougler et al., 2011; Nelson, 2015).
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988
Until the late 1980s, many American businesses used polygraph testing as a tool
to screen job applicants and employees (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). However, with the
passage of the EPPA of 1988, which is enforced by the DOL, employers engaged in
interstate commerce are not permitted to use lie detector tests for preemployment
screening or during the course of employment, with certain exemptions (American
Polygraph Association, 2005; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015; DOL, 2008). According to the
DOL (2008), exempt from the Act are federal, state, and local governments (DOL, 2008).
The federal government is permitted to give lie detector tests to employees of federal
contractors engaged in national security intelligence or counterintelligence functions. The
polygraph, but no other lie detector tests, may be administered in the private sector for
the following reasons (DOL, 2008, para. 6):
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1. To employees who are reasonably suspected of being involved in a workplace
incident that results in economic loss to the employer and who had access to
the property that is the subject of the investigation.
2. To prospective employees of armored car, security alarm, and security guard
firms who protect facilities, materials, or operations affecting health or safety,
national security, or currency and similar instruments.
3. To prospective employees of pharmaceutical and other firms authorized to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances who will have
direct access to such controlled substances. In addition, to current employees
who had access to persons or property that are the subject of an ongoing
investigation.
Examiners are required to have a valid or current license if it is a prerequisite by
the state in which the polygraph test is to be conducted (DOL, 2008). The DOL (2008,
para. 7) also noted that examiners are required to maintain a minimum of $50,000 bond
or professional liability coverage. Under the Act, prospective and current employees also
have legal rights. For example, prospective and current employees must be given a
written notice that explains their rights and the limitations imposed, such as questions that
are prohibited and restrictions on how the test results can be used. Within 3 years of an
alleged violation, prospective and current employees also have the right to take civil
actions in a federal or state court against employers who violate the Act for legal or
equitable relief, such as job reinstatement, promotion, and payment of loss wages and
benefits.
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Polygraph as a Deterrent Against Security Compromises
In an effort to address issues of crimes and screening for intelligence purposes,
the U.S. Army instituted its own polygraph training academy in the early 1950s (NCCA,
2013b). Use of the polygraph expanded from the U.S. Army to the federal government
and law enforcement agencies to use within the commercial sector (NCCA, 2013b).
Some employees who worked as clerks and bank tellers also had to do polygraph testing
(Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 2004). The expansive use of polygraph testing was driven by
organizations’ attempt to reduce theft of merchandise and money (National Research
Council, 2003).
However, there were exceptions to the law, which allowed federal government
and law enforcement agencies to require a polygraph as a condition of employment
(DOD, 1984; DOL, 2013; U.S. Government, 2013). The U.S. Army, a uniformed service
within the DOD, is authorized to use a screening polygraph to enhance protection of its
programs and seek out violations of certain national security laws (DOD, 1984; U.S.
Army, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013). The Intelligence and Security Command of the
U.S. Army, a member of the Intelligence Community, is authorized to use screening
polygraph examinations as part of its employee vetting process (DOD, 1984; U.S. Army,
1995; U.S. Government, 2013). One of the purposes of requiring individuals to undergo
these screening exams is to protect programs that are attractive targets for foreign
governments, terrorist groups, and insider threats (DOE, 2013). One of the stated goals of
the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s polygraph program is to deter
intentional violations of applicable security regulations (U.S. Army, 1993). However,
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despite deterrence efforts taken by many federal-level organizations, such as the U.S.
Army’s use of polygraph testing, some organizations fall victim to deliberate security
compromises (Defense Personnel and Security Research Center [PERSEREC], 2009;
Executive Branch, 2008).
The ODNI is an organization created in the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks (9/11) to integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense
of the United States (ODNI, 2013). There are 17 members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community and the ODNI is charged with providing direction and deconfliction to each
member on a national level (ODNI, 2013, 2015b). The U.S. Army’s Intelligence and
Security Command falls under the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and is a
member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (ODNI, 2015b).
Despite the use of polygraph analysis, a number of other high profile information
leaks have occurred of sensitive operations such as the foiling of a covert al-Qa’ida plot
to blow up an airliner with a sophisticated undergarment bomb, a collaboration of U.S.
and Israeli cyber operations designed to disrupt Iranian nuclear ambitions, and supposed
release of unauthorized information to journalists about the covert raid to kill Osama bin
Laden (Mak, 2012). This problem has become increasingly more political. To help
protect high level national security information, Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, announced steps to detect and deter unauthorized disclosures (ODNI, 2012).
The ODNI (2012) reported that these steps included the addition of a mandated question
in relation to unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the counterintelligence
polygraph. The director announced the independent investigations of selected
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unauthorized cases by the intelligence community inspector general (ICIG) when
Department of Justice (DOJ) declines to prosecute. The goal is to prevent selected
unauthorized disclosures cases that meet the threshold for administrative investigation
from being prematurely closed.
Polygraph’s Effect on Employees’ Behaviors and Attitudes
Polygraph examinations are used for preemployment or preclearance screening in
agencies involved in national security (National Research Council, 2003). The National
Research Council (2003) noted that current employees who are being considered for new
assignments, normally at a higher level of clearance, take part in preclearance screening.
Insider threats are becoming more frequent due to a number of reason, such as the
following (Figliuzzi, 2012, para. 4):
1. The pervasiveness of employee financial hardships during economic
difficulties.
2. The global crisis facing foreign nations, which makes it even more attractive.
3. Cost-effective and worth the risk to steal technology rather than invest in
research and development.
4. The ease of stealing anything stored electronically, especially when the
individual has legitimate access to it.
5. The increasing exposure to foreign intelligence services presented by the
reality of global business, joint ventures, and the growing international
footprint of U.S. companies.
The U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command uses the polygraph in the
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execution of its intelligence mission (U.S. Army, 1993, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013).
Among the mission of the polygraph program is deterrence of national security crimes
such as deliberate mishandling of classified information, espionage, and terrorism (DOE,
2013; U.S. Army, 1993). In order for a deterrence to be effective, researchers mentioned
that the population that is expected to change should be aware that there are certain
consequences (e.g., Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Paternoster et
al., 1983a; Watson, 1986). Similarly, Wright (2010) noted that employees who leak
information should be aware that there is an increased likelihood of detection and
subsequent punishment. The National Research Council (2003) noted that individuals
who are subjected to polygraph testing will either resign to avoid the exam and
subsequent interrogation, decide not to engage in a prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a
particular agency altogether. For those subjected to polygraph testing on a regular basis in
order to gain continued access to sensitive programs, the desired effect is that of
continued adherence to rules, or self-directed behavior and attitude change, or
modification (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; ODNI, 2015a; U.S.
Army, 1993).
An example of this can be seen with the U.S. Navy drug testing program. Drug
testing has affected the U.S. Navy in a dramatic way. After the U.S. Navy instituted
mandatory and random drug testing for its personnel in 1981, the U.S. Navy saw an
immediate drop of 60% in drug use (Borack, 1998). Researchers found that the drop was
attributed to the deterrence effect of personnel avoiding or changing their behavior
(Borack, 1998; Peterson, Jung, & Stanley, 2008; Strelan & Boeckman, 2006).
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Adhering to Security Regulations Due to Polygraph
The use of polygraph has been mandated for employees in certain jobs who have
access to highly sensitive information and activities in an effort to deter leaks (U.S. Army,
1993). The use of polygraph testing as a deterrence in the national security setting focuses
on reducing incidents of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, unauthorized foreign contact,
and deliberate mishandling of classified information by expectations of changes in
behavior and attitude (DOE, 2013; U.S. Army, 1993). During a screening examination,
one of the national security issues that is tested for is the mishandling of classified
information (National Research Council, 2003; ODNI, 2012). Pozen (2013) noted that
security compromises of classified information are very difficult to prosecute. Even
though there have been over 100 successful prosecutions for espionage, there are
probably hundreds of security compromises of classified information every year to the
media (PERSEREC, 2009; Pozen, 2013). Pozen argued that historically, there has been a
level of complacency within the Executive Branch in prosecuting security compromises.
Security compromises are a type of informal currency through which one can gain
an advantage (Pozen, 2013). Pozen related that it is also a very secretive world in which
journalists protect confidential informants to the point of voluntarily going to jail to
protect their identity (Pozen, 2013; Schmitt, 2005). An example of a major security
compromise involves Private First Class Bradley Manning who leaked the U.S State
Department’s cables and Iraq war logs (U.S. Army, 2011; United States v. Manning,
2013). Manning leaked hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. State Department cables
to Wikileaks, an organization dedicated to whistle blowers anonymity, who subsequently
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published most of the documents on the Internet (U.S. Army, 2011; United States v.
Manning, 2013). In contrast to high ranking members of the executive branch who are
most often associated with leaks, Manning was a low-level U.S. Army intelligence
analyst (Elsea, 2013; Pozen, 2013; U.S. Army, 2011; United States v. Manning, 2013).
Similarly, there are a number of incidents in which former CIA employees accidentally or
intentionally released information about classified operations or undercover agents
(Associated Press, 2013; Liptak, 2005; Mak, 2012).
Convicted Russian espionage agent and former U.S. Naval Warrant Officer John
Walker was instructed by his Russian case officers to avoid attaining a job that required a
polygraph in order to continue his access to classified information without increased fear
of detection (PERSEREC, 2009). The PERSEREEC (2009) reported that Walker was
instructed to retire instead of being promoted into a job that required a polygraph.
Similarly, convicted spy and former FBI agent Robert Hanssen also avoided jobs where
polygraph exams were required as a condition of employment. The PERSEREEC further
related that the CIA uses polygraph exams to maintain security, to include
counterintelligence investigations that rooted out and provided evidence to prosecute
Russian Spy Harold Nicholson. Other successful national security crime prosecutions that
were predicated on polygraph admissions include those by former U.S. Navy Seaman
Steven Hawkins, who admitted to storing classified documents with plans to sell them to
a foreign government in 1981; Steven Lalas, imprisoned for espionage on behalf of
Greece and admitted much more than initial debriefings indicated only after failing a
number of polygraph exams in 1993; and Ronald Montaperto, convicted of espionage for
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China and made full disclosure of espionage only after being confronted during a
polygraph session in 2003 (PERSEREC,, 2009).
After a series of high profile security compromises, President Obama ordered
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, to coordinate and conduct more
comprehensive polygraph exams in an attempt to root out unauthorized disclosures,
calling it a war on leakers (Mak, 2012; ODNI, 2012; Pozen, 2013). Pozen (2013) related
that while the federal government has the right to pursue prosecution against those who
are suspected of leaking information, the courts generally protect the press. The Obama
Administration is responsible for half of the prosecutions pertaining to leaked
information to the press since the Espionage Act of 1917 (DOJ Office of Public Affairs,
2012; Mak, 2012; Schmidt, 2013; Schmitt, 2005). Pozen highlighted that there are few
successful prosecutions despite the huge number of leaks. However, the Obama
Administration attained a guilty plea in the prosecution of a former CIA employee who
provided details about covert operations and sources to a member of the media. The
former employee plead guilty to disclosing the identity of an undercover agent. This
successful prosecution of the former CIA employee has emboldened the Obama
Administration as they have added additional charges against other individuals awaiting
prosecution for security violations (Aftergood, 2012; United States of America v.
Hitselberger, 2012).
Summary and Conclusions
Since recorded history, mankind has sought ways of determining if another person
is being deceptive (National Research Council, 2003). With scientific developments and
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improvements in law enforcement, a method known as polygraph analysis was developed
to record changes in physiology which resulted in a high resolution rate in detecting
certain types of deception (National Research Council, 2003). This technique was
eventually refined and adapted by the DOD, who now uses it in an effort to deter and
detect certain types of national security crimes (DOD, 1984; DOE, 2013; Handler &
Nelson, 2015; NCCA, 2011).
Deterrence results in either behavior and attitude change that are more consistent
with the organization or a person avoids employment at an agency that requires a
screening polygraph (National Research Council, 2003). Wright (2010) noted that in
order for deterrence to be effective, the population where the deterrence effect is sought
must be aware of both severity and certainty of a punishment. Even though severity has
an effect on deterrence, the certainty of detection and punishment has a much greater
effect (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster et al., 1983b;
Wright, 2010). For example, the change in behavior and attitude when there is certainty
of punishment can be seen in the changes in drug use within organizations that mandate
both initial and random drug testing for its employees (Borack, 1998). In the U.S. Navy,
there was a 60% decrease in drug use in the early 1980s when it instituted mandatory
drug testing for its employees (Borack, 1998, p. 17).
Similar to drug testing, random polygraph testing to ensure compliance with
regulations, has shown significant effects when individuals understand that there is an
increased chance of detection and sanction (Borack, 1998; Strelan & Boeckman, 2006).
Researchers noted that deterrence can be effective by increasing the number of random
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tests on a larger population, as opposed to the mandatory testing of a large population
(Abrams & Abrams, 1993; Apel, 2013; Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2003). The fear of detection of a crime is enough to cause social change because
individuals may be subjected to a polygraph test (Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986;
Weisburd Waring, & Chayet, 1995).
Polygraph testing is often used to detect the mishandling of classified information
(Pozen, 2013). The Obama Administration directed the Director of National Intelligence
to increase its review of polygraph questions concerning the mishandling of classified
and placed an emphasis on leaks to the media (ODNI, 2012, 2015a). The goal is to deter
and detect unauthorized disclosures (ODNI, 2012).
For polygraph to be an effective deterrent, employees must be aware of its use, its
effectiveness, and the certainty of crime detection (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin &
Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983b). Pozen (2013)
noted the historical failure of the Executive Branch to pursue leakers, despite statutes that
allow for their prosecution. The author reported that leakers within the Executive and
Legislative Branches are responsible for the vast majority of leaks. Research on criminal
deterrence indicated that certainty of detection has a much greater deterrent effect on
employees (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster et al.,
1983a). Other deterrent factors include individuals’ state of mind and their moral compass
(Strelan & Boeckman, 2006).
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime,
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986)
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SLT were used as the theoretical foundation in this study. While insider threats may be
maliciously intended, some are attributed to negligence or ignorance of security polices
(Herath & Rao, 2009). Herath and Rao (2009) found that employees’ perceptions about
the severity of breach, response efficacy, and self-efficacy tend to have a positive effect
on attitudes towards security policies. The researchers also found that social influence
had a significant effect on compliance intentions and resource availability was a
significant factor in increasing self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was found to be a significant
predictor of policy compliance intentions. Employees’ organizational commitment played
two roles by impacting intentions directly and promoted a belief that employee actions
have an effect on an organization’s overall information security.
In Chapter 2, I included the introduction, literature search strategy, theoretical
foundation, background of polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988, polygraph as a deterrent against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on
employees’ behavior and attitudes, adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and
a summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the introduction, research design and
rationale, methodology, data analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary. In Chapter
4, I include the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a summary
of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of findings,
limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine
whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between
a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past
year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience
was more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. I used a 15-minute
researcher-developed questionnaire. Cluster sampling was used to select the sample of
152 polygraph-treatment group and 174 no polygraph-treatment group (N = 326).
Data analysis included t test and factor analysis. Data was analyzed using SPSS.
The study was conducted in accordance with Walden University’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB) guidelines to ensure the ethical protection of research participants. The IRB
approved the application for the study and the approval number is 08-13-14-0118381. In
Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, methodology, data analysis plan,
threats to validity, and a summary of the chapter.
Research Design and Rationale
A descriptive and exploratory research design was used. This research design was
appropriate as the goal of the research study was to determine whether there was a
statistically significant difference between the polygraph-treatment and no polygraphtreatment groups’ perceptions of the deterrence effect of polygraph examinations.
McNabb (2008) pointed out that descriptive studies “provide a description of an event or
define a set of attitudes, opinions, or behaviors that are observed or measured at a given
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time and environment” (p. 97). Participants in the polygraph-treatment group were
employees who worked in the intelligence field and were subjected to random polygraph
testing as part of their work. Specifically, I used participants who took a polygraph
through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in South Korea
and Fort Meade, Maryland. Participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were
individuals who have never experienced a polygraph or the experience was more than a
year prior to the distribution of the survey. They were recruited from the local vicinity of
where I lived and worked in South Korea, the Walden University participant pool, and
from the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn.
The method of data collection was a survey. Data on the surveys were collected
through a 5-point Likert scale. A Likert scale is useful for data collection where I
essentially collected ordinal data, but needed to interpret them as though the data were
interval or ratio level data. The scale’s summative nature allows the individual perception
of deterrent effects to be quantitatively displayed and compared to another group, and has
been successfully used in past research on deterrence (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003).
Researchers have found that increasing the certainty of detection of undesirable
behaviors can have a deterrent effect on individuals engaging in those behaviors (Nagin
& Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a). These
researchers used a self-report method in their studies and noted the necessity of
anonymity in exchange for truthfulness when assessing potential negative behaviors and
attitudes, such as willingness to commit a crime in both the presence and absence of
punishment and authority figures (Nagin & Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003;
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Paternoster et al., 1983a). Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) noted that summative scales or
perceptual surveys allow participants to better express their concern for sanction of risks
prior to offending.
The use of the Likert scale format was needed in this study in order to determine
self-reported behavior and attitude changes. The Likert scale format allowed participants
to express the likelihood of behavior and attitude change when exposed to a situation in
which they are more likely to have violations of regulations detected through polygraph
exams. Participants’ perceptions were important in determining polygraph’s deterrence
effect against security compromises. Individuals with access to national security
information and who are employed in law enforcement positions are briefed on a regular
basis about their responsibilities in protecting national security and community standards,
as well as the sanctions for failure to protect such information (National Research
Council, 2003). Prior knowledge of potential sanctions increases deterrence since the
rational actor can then consider risk versus gain (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003). Nagin and
Pogarsky (2003) noted that sanctions must be known in order for the deterrence effects to
be felt within the population. Likewise, the researchers noted that individuals knowing
the sanctions and that there is an increased likelihood of detection deters negative actions.
Most screening polygraph examinees are aware of restrictions placed on their access to
sensitive information prior to their polygraph examination.
Methodology
In this section, the methodology was discussed. Sufficient depth was provided so
that other researchers can replicate the study. This section is organized in the following
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subsections: population; sampling and sampling procedures; procedures for recruitment,
participation, and data collection (primary data); pilot study; instrumentation; and
variables.
Population
The sample consisted of 326 volunteer participants, all of whom were U.S.
citizens or legal resident aliens located in South Korea and the United States.
Demographics were not collected due to a guarantee of anonymity and demographics
could have been used to identify likely volunteers. Originally, 372 individuals started the
online survey, but 326 total completed the survey, with the no polygraph-treatment group
having 174 participants and the polygraph-treatment group having 152 participants. The
completion rate for the surveys once a participant had started was 88%.
The 152 participants in the polygraph-treatment group were individuals who had
recently taken a screening polygraph examination within the previous year and were
currently in a position that required a polygraph as part of their job. They had taken the
polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in
South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 participants in the no polygraphtreatment group were individuals who had not taken a screening polygraph examination
in the last year and who were not required to take a polygraph as part of their job
requirements. I used nonintelligence personnel in the local vicinity where I lived and
worked in South Korea. In addition, students from the Walden University participant pool
were used, of which 56 students received credit for attempting to complete the surveys. I
also recruited and used individuals from the Walden University online community site,
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LinkedIn.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
I conducted an independent cluster sampling from all participants. Cluster
sampling refers to a sampling method that has the following properties: (a) the population
is divided into N groups, called clusters; (b) the researcher randomly selects n clusters to
include in the sample; (c) the number of observations within each cluster Mi is known,
and M = M1 + M2 + M3 + ... + MN-1 + MN; and (d) each element of the population can be
assigned to one, and only one, cluster (Stat Trek, 2015, para. 1). One cluster, the
polygraph-treatment group, were individuals who had recently taken a screening
polygraph examination within the previous year and were currently in a position that
required a polygraph as part of their job. Annually, within the DOD, there are
approximately 40,000 screening polygraph examinations conducted (DOD, 2009;
National Research Council, 2003). There are, however, no openly available demographic
or background data on individuals that typically receive a screening examination.
Generally, polygraph offices are located within communities that have a high
concentration of demand, such as placing a polygraph office near a large intelligence
processing center or base (National Research Council, 2003). I am currently located in
South Korea, so I recruited locally for both groups. I used the U.S. Army Intelligence
Polygraph Program with offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland, as a source
for the polygraph-treatment group.
I recruited approximately 170 volunteers for the second cluster, the no polygraphtreatment group. The second cluster of individuals were those who had not taken a
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screening polygraph examination in the last year and who were not required to take a
polygraph as part of their job requirements. Nonintelligence personnel were recruited
from the local vicinity of where I lived and worked in South Korea, the Walden
University participant pool, and the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn.
The identities of individuals who participated in the study were not known due to
anonymity attributed to the online survey. This sampling strategy was one of convenience
due to the remote location of my work site at the time in South Korea.
G*Power 3.1.7 was used to assess the required sample size for an independent
sample t test. Using a medium effect size (d = 0.50), a generally accepted power of .80 is
recommended when doing a t test for means (Sawyer, 1982); thus, a power level of 0.8
was used, and an alpha level of .05, the required sample size is 128. For exploratory
factor analysis in developing surveys, Field (2009) recommended at least 300 samples.
Therefore, at least 300 (final results were N = 326) participants were needed to be used to
have a large enough sample size to obtain significant findings.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection (Primary Data)
I completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Human Research Protections
training prior to data collection. In addition, I complied with all U.S. federal and state
regulations, which included informing participants about the level of confidentiality and
anonymity in the study. I began data collection after receiving approval to conduct the
study from the Walden University IRB.
I received permission to conduct the study from a polygraph branch chief in the
U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. For the polygraph-treatment group, I
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recruited individuals who completed a polygraph examination from both the South Korea
and Fort Meade, Maryland locations. I gave a hard copy consent form with the link to the
survey to individuals who had completed a polygraph tests within the past year.
Permission was also obtained from the branch chief to allow colleagues who
administered the polygraph at either location to provide individuals who had completed a
polygraph within the last year a hard copy consent form with the link to the survey. The
consent form outlined participants’ anonymity in the study as there would be no way to
identify who completed the survey (see Appendix A). The consent form outlined that no
compensation was offered for their voluntary participation. The consent form also stated
there were no connections between my study and their examination; therefore, they
should not expect any preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in
the study. Individuals who had pending polygraph examinations with me were excluded
from taking part in the study in order to prevent a possible conflict of interest or
perceived quid pro quo bias.
For the no polygraph-treatment group, with the permission of program managers
in the local vicinity where I lived and worked in South Korea, I recruited participants
who did not require a polygraph test as part of their job requirement or individuals who
did not complete a polygraph within more than a year prior to the distribution of the
survey. In addition, students from the Walden University participant pool were recruited,
of which 56 students received credit for attempting to complete the surveys. I also
recruited and used individuals from the Walden University online community site,
LinkedIn. Individuals under 18 years of age were excluded from participating in the
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study.
All participants were given a hard copy consent form with the survey link. The
consent form was also available on Survey Monkey. Implied consent was used; therefore,
the study replied on implicit endorsement rather than signed endorsement as participants
were informed on the consent form that completing the web link survey indicated their
voluntary consent to take part in the study. Participants completed the survey on Survey
Monkey (see Appendix B for the questionnaire). The Survey Monkey account was set to
ensure complete anonymity so that I could not identify individuals based on their
responses. In order to ensure anonymity, no demographic information was collected. An
advantage to using Survey Monkey was that it automatically saved the data into a form
compatible with the SPSS. The initial collection of the data determined if the individuals
were assigned to the polygraph-treatment or no polygraph-treatment group. All
nonattributable digital data from the questionnaires are kept on removable media in a safe
accessible only to me for a period of 5 years.
Participants in the study may have access to the results now that the research is
completed and approved. If participants want the results, they were instructed to send an
e-mail request to me. My e-mail address was provided on the consent form. Due to the
nature of the survey, it was unlikely that participation aroused any acute discomfort, such
as psychological harm, economic loss, damage to professional reputation, and physical
harm.
Pilot Study
The term, pilot studies, refer to mini versions of a full-scale study, which is also
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called feasibility studies, as well as the specific pretesting of a particular research
instrument such as a questionnaire or interview schedule (van Teijlingen & Hundley,
2001). Similarly, Leon, Davis, and Kraemer (2011) reported that the purpose of
conducting a pilot study is to examine the feasibility of an approach that is intended to be
used in a larger scale study. Pilot studies are used to improve the internal validity of a
questionnaire (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001).
Prior to the main study, I conducted a pilot study to test the reliability and validity
of the questions on the survey, as well as the feasibility of implementing the data
collection methodology. I collected at least 25 surveys in each of the polygraph-treatment
and no polygraph-treatment group (no polygraph-treatment N = 56; polygraph-treatment
N = 26). Once the surveys were electronically completed, the data from the survey were
automatically uploaded into SPSS for evaluation. The reliability of the survey was
determined by the use of the split-half method. I also conducted an exploratory factor
analysis to determine factors related to deterrence and ran a Cronbach’s alpha to
determine reliability of the questionnaire (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90). The SPSS was used
to display the descriptive statistics of the range, skew, and the standard deviation.
Instrumentation
The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs (see Appendix B). Researchers have
used similar types of perception surveys in their investigation on deterrence (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). The questionnaire was divided into two
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distinctly different sections. The first section identified the participant’s group
(polygraph-treatment or no polygraph-treatment), and included the informed consent
information. No demographic data were collected except for participants’ polygraph
experiences and whether or not their job required a polygraph. Therefore, no identifying
data were collected. The second section of the survey contained the scaled questions
along with definitions, which ensured a degree of consistency for certain terms used in
the questions. A 5-point Likert scale format was used, ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to
1 (strongly disagree). Three items were reverse scored. The questions were developed to
determine a participant’s self-reported likelihood of behavior and attitude change and
perceptions of polygraph’s deterrence effects.
In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from two
agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure
consistency with community standards. The list of questions were refined and reviewed
for clarity. Any unclear or repetitive questions were reviewed and removed or reworded
as necessary prior to progressing to the pilot study. Some words in the survey were
specific to national defense; therefore, I wrote definitions that would clarify how the
terminology would apply to both the polygraph-treatment and no polygraph-treatment
groups. In an effort to prevent confusion on word use, review of the definitions was
mandatory prior to proceeding to the survey on Survey Monkey. For example, words
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such as security and espionage were included in the definitions to ensure proper
understanding (see Appendix B).
Variables
The operational variable was deterrence effect by means of self-reported
perceptions of sanction risk to prior unlawful behavior or continuing acceptable behavior.
The variable had two factors from which the questions on the questionnaire were derived:
(a) admittance in a change of behavior and attitude and (b) belief of the effects of a
change in the workplace security because of the use of the polygraph to ensure
compliance. The creation of the questionnaire relied on the development of both factors
once the factor analysis was completed.
The overall deterrence effect was determined by t test evaluations of the factors
that resulted from the exploratory factor analysis, the results of the combination of
various survey questions that best answered the research questions, and comparison of
both groups with all questions evaluated using a t test with alpha set at .05. The scores
were calculated by adding the sums of the answers from the Likert scale. Higher scores
indicated an increased support for uses of the polygraph examination and self-reported
change in behavior and attitude, which enhanced support of polygraph use.
Data Analysis Plan
In this section I discussed the data analysis, which includes descriptive statistics
and factor analysis. I also provided in-depth discussions of how each research question
and hypotheses were analyzed. This section is organized in the following subsections:
data analysis and research questions and hypotheses.
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Data Analysis
In this section, I discussed the descriptive statistics used in the study. In addition, I
discussed the factor analysis that was performed. This subsection is organized in the
following areas: descriptive statistics and factor analysis.
Descriptive statistics. Data were analyzed using SPSS. Descriptive statistics
were obtained to describe the research variables used in the analysis. These included
means, standard deviations, and t tests.
Factor analysis. A factor analysis was conducted among the 30 polygraph
questions. A principal component analysis (PCA) was used. The PCA can be used to
discover subsets of questionnaire questions that correlate with one another but are
independent of another subset of correlated questions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). It was
assumed that three factors would be produced: (a) adherence to security regulations, (b)
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required,
and (c) belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises. The
factors were assumed to have no correlation with each other; thus, an orthogonal rotation
was used in the loading matrix (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Items were considered
strong loaders at .50 or better (Costello & Osborne, 2005)).
The number of factors extracted from the PCA were determined by examining
eigenvalues and the scree test. The number of factors used were those that have
eigenvalues greater than 1.00 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). In addition, the scree plot
obtained was assessed for the slope of the decreasing eigenvalues. In addition, the Kaiser
rule of eigenvalues greater than .70 for the communalities was assessed (Mertler &

71
Vannatta, 2010).
To conduct the principal components analysis, the assumptions of sample size,
normality, and absence of outliers were assessed. In order to run the factor analysis, a
large sample size should be used. MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, and Hong (1999)
suggested at least 100 participants. This number can increase up to 500 if a very large
number of items are used. With a total of 30 questions used in this study’s factor analysis,
the general rule of thumb of 300 participants was a large enough sample to run the
analysis (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Univariate normality among
the items is also important for the analysis to run properly. Univariate normality was
assessed using skew. A z score derived from skew and its standard error were used to
assess for normality. For all z scores greater than ±1.96, the variable was significantly
skewed and considered for removal from the PCA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Outliers
were assessed for, defined as values greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean.
Once the PCA was conducted and factors were determined, a Cronbach’s alpha
reliability testing was conducted on the factors. George and Mallery’s (2010) guidelines
for reliability were used, where reliability greater than .90 is excellent, than .80 is good,
than .70 is acceptable, than .60 is questionable, and less than .60 is unacceptable. Once
good reliability was found for all factors, the summation of the factors was done to create
the factor scores.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this subsection, I provided in-depth discussions of how each research question
and hypotheses were analyzed. This subsection is organized in the following areas:
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Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3.
Research Question 1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
To examine Research Question 1, I conducted an independent sample t tests to
assess if there were differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (no
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). The independent sample t test was the
appropriate analysis to conduct with the goal being to assess statistical differences in a
continuous dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In
this case, the factor were based on the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment was the continuous
dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent variable was group, with
levels: no polygraph-treatment and polygraph-treatment. A t test was conducted for each
adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An alpha level of .05 was
used for the t test.
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The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis.
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its
standard error were used to assess for normality. For z scores greater than ±1.96, the
variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not have
a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for
through the use of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch
estimate for the t test was run instead, which does not assume equal variances.
Research Question 2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
To examine Research Question 2, I conducted an independent sample t test to
assess if there were differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph
can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraphtreatment). The independent sample t test is the appropriate analysis to conduct when the
goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous dependent variable by a
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dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case, the factors that were
based on changing the behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered
at work were the continuous dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent
variable was group, with levels: no polygraph-treatment and treatment. A t test was
conducted for each adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An
alpha level of .05 was used for the t test.
The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis.
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its
standard error were used to assess for normality. For the z scores greater than ±1.96, then
the variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not
have a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for
by the use of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch estimate
for the t test was run instead, which does not assume equal variances.
Research Question 3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
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Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
To examine Research Question 3, I conducted an independent sample t test to
assess if there were differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent
against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraphtreatment). The independent sample t test is the appropriate analysis to conduct when the
goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous dependent variable by a
dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case, the factors that were
based on the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises
were continuous dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent variable
was group, with levels: no polygraph-treatment and treatment. A t test was conducted for
each adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An alpha level of .05
was used for the t test.
The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis.
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its
standard error were used to assess for normality. For z scores greater than ±1.96, the
variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not have
a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for by way
of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch estimate for the t test
was run instead, which does not assume equal variances.
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Threats to Validity
In this section, I discussed threats to the validity of the survey. In addition, I
discussed informed consent and ethical considerations. This section is organized in the
following subsections: threats to validity of the instrument and ethical procedures.
Threats to Validity of the Instrument
The survey design has many strengths, but it also has several weaknesses. In
relation to this study, one of the possible validity threats of the survey design is that
surveys are inflexible in many ways (Babbie, 2007). A 5-point Likert scale format was
used and participants may be resistant to this format. Even though definitions were
provided to help ensure full understanding of the questions asked, when filling out the
surveys, participants may find some questions ambiguous. Since the survey was
conducted through Survey Monkey, I was not present to provide additional information
to participants. However, participants were provided with my contact information on the
consent form in case they had any questions.
Selection or sampling bias was an external threat to validity. In regard to selection
bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received their
screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment. However,
participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections between
the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any preferential
treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Nonresponse bias is also
another threat, which could have resulted in a low response rate on the survey and a
decrease in the sample size, which could also affect the generalizability of the data. Some
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surveys could not be used as some participants did not complete all the questions.
However, there was enough participation to meet the sample size needed, where 300
participants was the minimum and 326 individuals participated in the study.
An internal threat to validity was the development of the survey and ensuring its
reliability and validity. To address this threat, I used the assistance of experts in the field
in developing my survey questions and conducted a pilot study before using the survey in
the main study.
Ethical Procedures
The study was conducted in accordance with the parameters established by
Walden University’s IRB to ensure the ethical protection of research participants. Hard
copy consent forms were provided to participants during recruitment and an electronic
consent form was also provided on Survey Monkey (see Appendix A). Participation in
the study replied on implicit endorsement rather than signed endorsement. Participants
were anonymous as no demographic data were collected. I did not knowingly recruit
individuals from vulnerable populations. I also did not recruit volunteers under 18 years
old and ensured that participants were U.S. citizens or resident aliens. I also excluded
individuals who had pending polygraphs with me.
The consent form outlined participants’ protections and the ethical guidelines I
followed during the research project. The consent form included my contact information
in case individuals had questions at any time before, during, or after the study. In
addition, the consent form included the selection criteria for the study, outlined risks
(physical or psychological) that the participants might experience, and participants were
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informed that they were not obligated to complete any parts of the study with which they
were not comfortable. In addition, the consent form outlined the anticipated benefits of
the study, the lack of compensation, privacy information, disclosure of any potential
conflicts of interest, and the contact information of the Walden University representative
with whom they could privately talk about their rights as participants. Participants were
also informed that all data will be kept on removable media in a safe accessible only to
me for a period of 5 years.
Summary
In this study, I determined the perceived deterrent effect related to the use of
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a
polygraph examination within the same time period. There were152 participants in the
polygraph-treatment group and 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group (N =
326). Data were analyzed with a t test to determine whether there was a statistically
significant difference between the groups. I also conducted an exploratory factor analysis
to determine factors related to deterrence. Data were analyzed using the SPSS.
The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs. A pilot study was conducted on the
survey prior to the main study. All individuals were given a hard copy consent form with
the survey link on Survey Monkey. The consent form was also available on Survey
Monkey and implied consent was used. To ensure anonymity, no demographic
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information was collected. All nonattributable digital data from the questionnaires are
kept on removable media in a safe accessible only to me for a period of 5 years.
Participants were provided with my contact information and the Walden University
representative’s telephone number.
In Chapter 3, I included the introduction, research design and rationale,
methodology, data analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary of the chapter. In
Chapter 4, I include the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a
summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the
study.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this study, I determined the perceived deterrent effect related to the use of
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a
polygraph examination within the same time period. Three research questions were
examined. The first research question determined the differences between the two groups
of adhering more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition
of employment. The second research question determined the differences between the
two groups in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly
administered at work. The third research question determined the differences between the
two groups in their beliefs that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security
compromises. In Chapter 4, I present the pilot study, data collection and study results,
and a summary of the chapter.
Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted in December 2014. The purpose of the pilot study
was to determine the reliability of the questions on the survey and the feasibility of
implementing the data collection methodology. I collected at least 25 surveys in each of
the polygraph-treatment and no polygraph-treatment groups (polygraph-treatment N = 26;
no polygraph-treatment N = 56). Based on Field’s (2005) guidelines, 82 was a relatively
small number for conducting an exploratory factor analysis. The factor analysis, however,
produced a six-factor solution. When examining factor loadings greater than .50, one
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factor had only one question to it (Factor 5). I ran Cronbach’s alpha reliability testing on
each of the factor solutions. Factors 1 – 4 had excellent reliability (>.90). However, factor
6 had poor reliability (.40). Therefore, the pilot study produced four good factors to use.
Below are the questions that relate to each factor:


Factor 1: q15, q18, q27, q28, q32, and q41



Factor 2: q16, q17, q24, q25, q26, q29, q31, q37, and q42



Factor 3: q34, q35, q45, and q46



Factor 4: q19, q20, q21, and q22

Questions that could have been dropped from this list were q13, q14, q30, q33,
q36, q39, q40, q43, and q44 because they cross-loaded or were present to detect
answering bias and would not have been evaluated. I decided to retain all questions due
to the inadequate number of survey questions for an adequate exploratory factor analysis.
Only five of the proposed questions on the list could have been dropped because the
remainder were present to detect answering bias in the survey and would not have been
included in the final factor analysis. The methodology of collecting surveys was found to
be sufficient for expanded use. If a volunteer made a mistake when filling out the survey,
the Survey Monkey website would record a cookie that stated a survey had been
completed. The volunteer could not open the survey again without clearing out the
cookies. When soliciting volunteers, I had to provide each volunteer with instructions on
how to clear out cookies from a web browser.
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Data Collection and Study Results
In this section, I discussed the descriptive statistics used in the study. I also
discussed the factor analysis and the results of the study. This section is organized in the
following subsections: descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and results.
Descriptive Statistics
Originally, 372 participants started the online survey and 326 individuals
completed the survey. Therefore, the sample consisted of 326 participants, all of whom
were U.S. citizens or legal resident aliens. There were 152 participants in the polygraphtreatment group and 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group. Thus, the
completion rate for the surveys once a participant had started was 88%. Participants were
located in South Korea and the United States. Frequencies and percentages for nominal
variables are presented in Table 1. Demographics were not collected due to a guarantee of
anonymity and demographics could have been used to identify likely volunteers.
Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables
Variables
Taken Polygraph in the Last Year
No
Yes

n

%

174
152

53
47

Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100.
Factor Analysis
To assist in dimension reduction, I conducted a PCA on the 34 survey items. A
PCA creates linear combinations of variables without assuming an underlying structure of
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data (Suhr, 2005). PCA is commonly used when sample sizes are large, the variables are
highly correlated, and the goal is to reduce the number of variables (Suhr, 2005).
I assumed it would produce three factors (adherence to security regulations,
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required,
and belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises) and
that the factors would not be correlated. Therefore, I used an orthogonal rotation in the
loading matrix (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). However, the results on the initial PCA
indicated a total of six components, similar in nature to the pilot survey. Upon further
examination, the factor correlation matrix indicated that most factors were correlated at
.32 or above. Based on Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2012) guidelines, any factors above .32
should use oblique rotation methods. Therefore, the PCA was conducted again,
implemented a manual constraint of three factors, and used direct oblimin rotation. The
first three components had eigenvalues greater than one and cumulatively explained 59%
of the variance. The scree plot in Figure 1 shows that the first principal component
accounts for the majority of the variance in the items.
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Figure 1. Scree plot for factor loadings.
The first factor consisted of 11 items, the second factor consisted of four items,
and the third factor consisted of 12 items. The results of the PCA can be seen in Table 2.
The items in each factor produced by the PCA are presented in Table 3.
Table 2
Eigenvalues of the Three Principal Components for Perceptions of Polygraph
Examinations
Principal Component
Comp. 1
Comp. 2
Comp. 3

Eigenvalue

% of Variance

15.46
2.70
1.94

45.46
7.93
5.70

Cumulative % of
Variance
45.46
53.39
59.09
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Table 3
Items in Factors Produced by PCA for Polygraph Examinations Perceptions
Factor 1
RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
RANDOM polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified
information.
RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
RANDOM polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.
A RANDOM polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises.
Those subjected to RANDOM polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security
regulations.
As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam.
People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam.
More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the Department of
Defense.
I am willing to take a RANDOM polygraph exam as part of a security program.
Factor 2
I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a
MANDATORY polygraph exam.
I adhere more closely to security regulation because I am subjected to a
MANDATORY polygraph exam on security regulations.
I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am subjected to a
RANDOM polygraph exam on security regulations.
I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a
RANDOM polygraph exam.
Factor 3
I am willing to take a MANDATORY polygraph exam in order to enhance a
security program.
People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a
MANDATORY polygraph exam.
As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a MANDATORY
polygraph exam.
A MANDATORY polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security
compromises.
MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security
compromises.
(continued)
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MANDATORY polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.
People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam.
Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program.
The results of a polygraph should not be used when making a security decision.
(Reverse scored)
I would commit a security violation even if I was subjected to a polygraph exam.
(Reverse scored)
Information on RANDOM polygraph examinations should be excluded from
MANDATORY Threat Awareness briefings. (Reverse scored)

I examined the factors with regards to the research questions. It indicated that
Factor 2 assessed adherence to security regulations and was appropriate to address
Research Question 1. This factor contained four items, which were worded in a way that
would be suitable for those that have recently taken a screening polygraph within the last
year, those that have not taken a screening polygraph within the last year and did not need
one for their current job (e.g., “I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am
subjected to random polygraphs”), and those who have not taken a polygraph (e.g., “I
would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were given a random polygraph”).
Therefore, responses that were applicable for participants given categorization were used
to create a composite score of two variables (security adherence due to random
polygraphs and security adherence due to mandatory polygraphs).
Because the other factors produced by the PCA did not directly assess the
remaining research questions, I created new composite scores. A composite score for
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required
(Research Question 2) was created from the mean of seven items and belief that a
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises (Research Question 3)
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was created from the mean of seven items. These composites, and the items contained in
each, are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Items in Composite Score for Perceptions of Polygraph Examinations
Adherence to Security Regulations
I [would] adhere more closely to security regulations because I am [if I were]
subjected to a mandatory polygraph exam.
I [would] adhere more closely to security regulations because I am [if I were]
subjected to a random polygraph exam.
Admittance of Behavior and Attitude Change
Those subjected to random polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security
regulations.
As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a random polygraph
exam.
People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a random
polygraph exam.
More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the department of
defense.
I am willing to take a random polygraph exam as part of a security program.
People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam.
Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program.
Perceptions of Polygraph Efficacy
Random polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
Random polygraph exams can help prevent leaks of classified information.
Random polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
Random polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.
Mandatory polygraph exams can help detect deliberate security compromises.
Mandatory polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
Mandatory polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.

To ensure that each of these composite scores had good internal consistency, I
used a Cronbach’s alpha analysis for reliability. I used George and Mallery’s (2010)
guidelines for reliability where reliability greater than .90 is excellent, greater than .80 is
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good. I did not use any lower scores for reliability. The composite score for adherence to
security regulations had excellent reliability (α = .92). The composite score for
admittance to change of behavior and attitude likewise had excellent reliability (α = .90),
and the composite score for belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent had excellent
reliability (α = .92). The means, standard deviations, and reliability are presented in Table
5.
Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability for Composite Scores
M

SD

α

No. of items

Adherence to Security Regulations

3.29

1.17

.92

2

Admittance of Change of Behavior and attitude

3.90

0.79

.90

7

Effective Deterrent Against Security Compromises

3.76

0.81

.92

7

Variable

Results
In this subsection, I discussed the results of the three research questions. The
statistical analysis findings are organized by research questions. This subsection is
organized in the following areas: Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and
Research Question 3.
Research Question 1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
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H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
To examine Research Question 1, I conducted an independent sample t test to
assess if there were differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (taken
polygraph in past year: yes vs. no). The independent sample t test is the appropriate
analysis to conduct when the goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous
dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). The
composite score for adherence to security regulations was the continuous dependent
variable and group (taken polygraph in past year: yes vs. no) was the independent
variable. An alpha level of .05 was used for the test.
Prior to analysis, I assessed the assumption of normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test.
The result of the test was significant, p < .001, indicating a violation of the assumption of
normality. However, Howell (2012) suggests that the t test is robust despite violations of
normality. The assumption of equality of variance was assessed using Levene’s test. The
result of the test was not significant, p = .470, indicating the assumption of equality of
variance was met.
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The results of the independent sample t test were not significant, t(324) = 0.55, p
= .584, suggesting that there was not a statistically significant difference in adherence to
security regulations by group. Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted and the
alternative hypothesis was rejected. Results of the independent sample t test are presented
in Table 6. Figure 2 shows the average score for adherence to security regulations by
group.
Table 6
Independent Sample t Test for Adherence to Security Regulations by Group
No
Variable

Adherence to security regulations

Yes

t(324)

p

d

M

SD

M

0.55

.584

0.06

3.33

1.18

3.26

Figure 2. Adherence to security regulations by group (taken polygraph in past year).
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Research Question 2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment).
To examine Research Question 2, I conducted an independent sample t test to
assess if there were differences in admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph test can be randomly administered by group (taken polygraph in the past year:
yes vs. no). Prior to the analysis, I assessed the assumption of normality with a ShapiroWilk test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of
normality. However, Howell (2012) suggests that the t test is robust despite violations of
normality. The assumption of equality of variance was assessed using Levene’s test. The
result of the test was significant, p = .007, violating the assumption of equality of
variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which does not assume equality of variance, was
used (Stevens, 1999).
The results of the t test were significant, t(321) = -6.09, p < .001, suggesting that
there was a difference in admittance to change of behavior and attitude by group.
Participants who had not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower
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than participants who had taken a polygraph in the past year. Based on Cohen’s (1992)
guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a medium effect size. The
alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was rejected. Results of the t
test are presented in Table 7. Figure 3 shows the mean score for admittance to behavior
and attitude change by group.
Table 7
Independent Sample t Test for Admittance to Behavior and Attitude Change by Group
(Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No)
No

Yes

Variable

t(321)

p

d

M

SD

M

Admittance to Behavior and attitude

-6.09

.001

0.67

3.66

0.83

4.16

Change

Figure 3. Admittance of behavior and attitude change by group (taken polygraph in the
past year.
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Research Question 3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraphtreatment vs. polygraph-treatment)?
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment).
I conducted an independent samples t test to assess if there were differences in
perceptions of polygraphs as effective deterrent to security compromises by group (taken
polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no). Prior to analysis, I assessed the assumption of
normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001,
violating the assumption of normality. However, Howell (2012) suggested that the t test is
robust despite violations of normality. The assumption of equality of variance was
assessed using Levene’s test. The result of the test was significant, p = .008, violating the
assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which does not
assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).
The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(321) = -7.01, p <
.001, suggesting that there was a difference in perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in
deterring and preventing security compromises by group. Participants who had not taken
a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a
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polygraph in the past year. Based on Cohen’s (1992) guidelines, the difference between
the two groups was a medium effect size. The alternative hypothesis was accepted and
the null hypothesis was rejected. Results of the independent sample t test are presented in
Table 8. Figure 4 shows the mean score for perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in
deterring and preventing security compromises by group.
Table 8
Independent Sample t Test for Perceptions of Polygraphs Efficacy in
Deterring/Preventing Security Compromises by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No)
No

Yes

Variable

t(321)

p

d

M

SD

M

Perceptions of Polygraphs efficacy in

-7.01

.001

0.77

3.49

0.83

4.07

deterring/preventing security
compromises

Figure 4. Perceptions of polygraphs efficacy by group (taken polygraph in past year).
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Summary
Two of the three research questions had statistically significant results, which
indicated a deterrent effect with regards to utility of a polygraph with those who had
recently taken a polygraph examination within the last year. Specifically, for Research
Question 2, the results indicated that there is a significant difference in the changing of
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group. For
Research Question 3, results indicated that there is a significant difference in the belief
that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group. On the
other hand, for Research Question 1, findings indicated no significant difference in the
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a
condition of employment by group. However, when reviewing Research Question 1
factors, it is interesting to note that those who have not taken a polygraph within the past
year and do not require a polygraph as part of their current job were more likely to
display a supportive attitude towards increased adherence to security regulations. In
Chapter 4, I included the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a
summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the
study.

96
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In this descriptive and exploratory research study, I determined whether there was
a perceived deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year
compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same
time period. The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs. This study was designed to answer
three research questions: (a) To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment), (b) to what
extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be
randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraphtreatment), and (c) to what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an
effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
polygraph-treatment)?
The results of the study indicated that there is a significant difference in the
changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work
by group. In addition, findings indicated a significant difference in the belief that a
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group. On the other
hand, findings indicated no significant difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely
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to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group.
In Chapter 5, I discussed the interpretation of findings, limitations of the study,
recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study.
Interpretation of the Findings
In an effort to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related
to the use of polygraphs, this descriptive and exploratory research study examined three
research questions. The finding are interpreted in the context of the theoretical foundation
and the literature review. This section is organized in the following subsections: Research
Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3.
Research Question 1
To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (no
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? The results of the independent sample t
test were not significant, t(324) = 0.55, p = .584, suggesting that there was not a
statistically significant difference in adherence to security regulations by group.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted and the alternative hypothesis was rejected.
The research results revealed that individuals already subjected to a polygraph
were not more likely to adhere more closely to security regulations as a result of being
subjected to a polygraph examination. This finding may be attributed to the complacency
within the Executive Branch in prosecuting security compromises (Pozen, 2013). Pozen
(2013) noted that security compromises of classified information are very difficult to
prosecute. Even though there have been over 100 successful prosecutions for espionage,
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there are probably hundreds of security compromises of classified information every year
to the media (PERSEREC, 2009; Pozen, 2013). Pozen highlighted that there are few
successful prosecutions despite the huge number of leaks. This also relates to Bandura’s
(1974, 1977, 1986) SLT as it takes into account individuals’ past experiences, which
influences reinforcement, expectations, and expectancies (Boston University School of
Public Health, 2013). All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a
specific behavior and their reasons for doing so (Boston University School of Public
Health, 2013).
In addition, the lack of difference in adherence to security regulations between the
two groups can also be interpreted in the context of Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational
choice model as organizational context factors could indirectly influence individual
employees’ compliance intention, which is influenced by perceived benefits, formal
sanctions, and security risks (Li et al., 2010). The effect of sanction severity was found to
be moderated by personal norms (CITE). Similarly, in relation to Paternoster and
Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model, Paternoster and Simpson noted that the
decisions of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they perceive for
themselves, (b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and (c) the
presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context
of the organization.
Research Question 2
To what extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs.
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polygraph-treatment)? The results of the t test were significant, t(321) = -6.09, p < .001,
suggesting that there was a difference in admittance to change of behavior and attitude by
group. Based on Cohen’s (1992) guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a
medium effect size. The alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was
rejected.
The research results revealed that participants who had not taken a polygraph in
the past year or ever scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a
polygraph in the past year. Therefore, individuals who are subjected to random polygraph
testing are more likely aware of certain consequences to polygraph testing, such as
detection and subsequent punishment (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986; Wright, 2010). The National Research
Council (2003) noted that individuals who are subjected to polygraph testing will either
resign to avoid the exam and subsequent interrogation, decide not to engage in a
prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a particular agency altogether. For those subjected to
polygraph testing on a regular basis in order to gain continued access to sensitive
programs, the desired effect is that of continued adherence to rules, self-directed behavior
and attitude change, or modification (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012;
ODNI, 2015a; U.S. Army, 1993).
The significant differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph
can be randomly administered at work by group can also be interpreted in the context of
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model as employees who are subjected
to random polygraph testing at the individual level may be more aware of the potential
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costs of wrongdoing, such as the severity of formal sanctions, and other potential costs
such as loss of occupational position; social censure from colleagues, family, and friends;
personal embarrassment, and shame. In addition, the employees in the polygraphtreatment group may be more dissuaded from offending if the organization or a staff
member has recently been sanctioned for similar conduct or the company has
organizational restraints such as an ethics hotline or random polygraph testing
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Furthermore, employees in the polygraph-treatment
group may be more affected by normative factors such as their moral evaluation of
wrongdoing (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). According to Paternoster and Simpson,
employees may be restrained by moral inhibitions; therefore, some acts of corporate
crime are not committed because they are believed to be wrong.
Similarly, the findings can also be interpreted in the context of Vance and
Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model as the polygraph-treatment group may have
higher considerations for the severity of possible formal and informal sanctions, their
moral beliefs, and perceived benefits, such as incentives, when considering policy or
organizational violations. For example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that only the severity
of formal sanctions effectively reduced IS misuse. Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986) SLT
can also be applied to the findings as employees in the polygraph-treatment group likely
anticipated the consequences of their behaviors at a higher level than the no polygraphtreatment group. Therefore, the polygraph-treatment group anticipated the consequences
of their actions before they engaged in the behavior and these anticipated consequences
influenced the successful completion of the behavior. In addition, the employees in the
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polygraph-treatment group appeared to learn by observing what others do, consider the
consequences that others experienced, rehearse (mentally first) what might happen in
their own lives if they followed other’s behavior, take action by trying the behavior,
compare their experiences with what happened to others, and confirm their belief in the
new behavior.
Research Question 3
To what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraphtreatment)? The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(321) = -7.01, p
< .001, suggesting that there was a difference in perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in
deterring and preventing security compromises by group. Based on Cohen’s (1992)
guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a medium effect size. The
alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was rejected.
The research results revealed that participants who had not taken a polygraph in
the past year scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a polygraph in
the past year. This finding may be attributed to employees in the polygraph-treatment
group beliefs about its use, its effectiveness, and the certainty of crime detection.
Research on criminal deterrence indicated that certainty of detection has a much greater
deterrent effect on employees (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2001; Paternoster et al., 1983a). Therefore, employees in the polygraph-treatment group
appear to be more aware that there are certain consequences to wrongdoing (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986),
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which could be detected by means of polygraph analysis. Wright (2010) noted that
employees who leak information should be aware that there is an increased likelihood of
detection and subsequent punishment. Therefore, employees who are subjected to
polygraph testing will either resign to avoid the exam and subsequent interrogation,
decide not to engage in a prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a particular agency
altogether (National Research Council, 2003). Based on the findings, polygraph testing
appears to have a deterrent effect on employees in the polygraph-treatment group who
have access to sensitive programs. The desired effect of polygraph analysis is continued
adherence to rules, self-directed behavior and attitude change, or modification (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; ODNI, 2015a; U.S. Army, 1993).
The findings can also be interpreted in the context of Paternoster and Simpson’s
(1996) rational choice model, where the use of polygraph analysis is used to detect and
deter wrongdoing. Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that threats of criminal and
civil sanctions directed against the individual inhibited the intention to commit corporate
crime as well as the fear of informal sanctions. The threat of legal sanctions may be
necessary to maintain the legitimacy of an extensive network of informal and normative
controls. Similarly, Li et al. (2010) found that compliance intention will increase when
employees perceive high threats from formal or informal sanctions. However, the
researchers contended that theoretical models of corporate crime and public policy efforts
must contain instrumental (threats of punishment) and deontological (appeals to morality)
factors.
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The findings of my study can also be interpreted in the context of Bandura’s
(1974, 1977, 1986) SLT, where employees vicariously learn about punishments from
their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues, and social cues in the
inhibitive learning process and becoming deterred from committing future fraudulent acts
(Yiu et al., 2014). Subsequently, employees are at least minimally rational agents and
their conduct is partly guided by the expected consequences of their behavior (Paternoster
& Simpson, 1996).
Limitations of the Study
This study had several limitations. First, this study determined the perceived
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between two groups; therefore, the study
remained distinct in its focus and limited in its scope. This study was not designed to
answer questions related to the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph
examinations. Although these topics may be important to public policy and
administration field, psychology field, and the intelligence community, they were not the
focus of this research effort.
A second possible limitation of the study included generalizing the results since a
cluster sampling of 326 participants, all of whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident
aliens located in South Korea and the United States, was used and the results of the study
are limited to similar populations of employees. The 152 participants in the polygraphtreatment group had taken the polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174
participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and
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legal resident aliens who lived and worked in South Korea, were students from the
Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden University online
community site, LinkedIn. These employees’ unique perceptions may not be
generalizable to other populations.
Third, I used a 15-minute researcher-developed survey, which has not been used
in past studies. However, a pilot study was conducted on the survey prior to using it in
the main study. In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from
two agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure
consistency with community standards. In addition, the survey was found to have very
high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90).
Fourth, selection or sampling bias was another limitation of the study. In regard to
selection bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received
their screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment.
However, participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections
between the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any
preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Future
research could exclude participants who have taken a polygraph the researcher. In
addition, changes to the populations could be made in future research, where more
similar populations are compared. Specifically, two similar groups of participants who
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work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within
the last year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the
experience was more than a year prior, could be compared and the results compared to
the findings found in this study.
A fifth limitation was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias could have resulted in
a low response rate on the survey and a decrease in the sample size, which could also
affect the generalizability of the data. Some surveys could not be used as some
participants did not complete all the questions. However, there was enough participation
to meet the sample size needed, where 300 participants was the minimum and 326
individuals participated in the study.
A sixth limitation was self-report or social desirability bias. Self-report or social
desirability bias has to be considered as participants may want to be perceived positively
so they may not respond honestly. In addition, there are problems inherent with selfreport data as participants may not accurately or fully self-evaluate themselves. In order
to address this bias, the Likert scale format was used, which did not allow participants the
freedom to include additional information that they may have felt was important. It was
assumed that participants answered honestly to the questions asked on the survey.
Recommendations
Research Question 1 results revealed that individuals already subjected to a
polygraph were not more likely to adhere more closely to security regulations as a result
of being subjected to a polygraph examination. Therefore, the null hypothesis was
accepted and the alternative hypothesis rejected. Based on this finding, future research
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could incorporate the perceptions of participants about the use of polygraph testing with
other screening or investigative information that they have undergone to determine if a
multifaceted approach would result in a significant difference between the groups in
relation to the likelihood of adhering more closely to security regulations. For example,
the American Polygraph Association (2005) discussed the use of polygraph results in
conjunction with other screening or investigative information when making decisions.
Jenkins (2013) suggested the use of mouse movement features that are diagnostic of
deception for screening surveys. Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued for a
multifaceted approach to corporate crime control, such as the use of moral education
(e.g., business ethics) and legal sanctions. Vance and Siponen (2012) suggested that
organizations should include other means to discourage security violations apart from
formal sanctions because they are not always effective in deterring policy violations.
As discussed in the limitations of the study, to reduce sampling or selection bias,
it is recommended that future studies exclude participants who have taken a polygraph
from the researcher as participants may expect preferential treatment. In addition, another
previously discussed recommendation was the use of similar populations between the
groups that are being compared. Therefore, using two similar groups of participants who
work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within
the last year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the
experience was more than a year prior. These results could then be compared to the
results found in this study.
In this study, demographic questions were excluded from the survey in order to
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protect participants’ identities and ensure anonymity. However, while still ensuring
anonymity, in future studies, researchers could collect limited demographic information
that would not reveal participants’ identities, such as gender, race and age group. Then
using these demographic data, additional analysis could be conducted to see if there are
differences in the responses based on gender, race, and age.
In future studies, researchers could further assess the validity and reliability of the
survey instrument with similar populations as well as in other settings and culture.
Similarly, researchers could also replicate the study using the same methods, but with a
similar population, and in different settings and culture as well. The results of these
studies could ensure that the results found in this study are valid and reliable, determine
the role of extraneous variables, and inspire new research based on findings.
Future research could also focus on modifying the survey’s 5-point Likert scale format to
a 4-point Likert scale format by removing the neutral option. Researchers have suggested
that when presented with a neutral response option, participants will be more likely to
select that option than report their actual opinion (Bishop, 1987; Edwards & Smith, 2014;
Johns, 2005; Kalton, Roberts, & Holt, 1980; Krosnick et al., 2001; Nowlis, Kahn, &
Dhar, 2002).
Implications
Even though the findings for Research Question 1 indicated no significant
difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph
is required as a condition of employment by group, the findings for Research Questions 2
and 3 were statistically significant. The findings indicated that there is a significant
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difference in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly
administered at work by group and there is a significant difference in the belief that a
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group.
Based on these findings, there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use
of polygraphs between the two groups. At the individual level, employees in sensitive
positions who face random polygraph testing may take greater care to avoid even minor
security infractions in order to avoid the possibility of a future deceptive reading on a
polygraph test. At the policy and organizational levels, one of the goals of polygraph
testing is deterrence, which means keeping employees, who have committed or may
engage in wrongdoing, out of sensitive positions and keeping employees who are already
in sensitive positions from doing undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003).
The findings of Research Question 2 that random polygraph testing may result in a
change of behavior and attitude is significant as it may deter actions that threaten national
interests based on the perceived likelihood and consequences of detection. Therefore, the
implications for positive social change stemming from these findings include
recommendations to the nation’s national security agencies to continue enforcing the
polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the
possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national
intelligence infrastructure.
The findings for Research Question 1 indicated no significant difference in the
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a
condition of employment by group. Therefore, as noted in the recommendations section,
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organizations should use multifaceted approach, where polygraph testing is used in
conjunction with other screening or investigative information when making decisions. A
multifaceted approach could include the use of polygraph testing, along with mouse
movement features that are diagnostic of deception for screening surveys, moral
education, and legal sanctions (American Polygraph Association, 2005; Jenkins, 2013;
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Vance & Siponen, 2012).
While there is an abundance of literature on the reliability and validity of
polygraph analysis, this research study added to the literature by filling a gap in the
public policy and administration literature with respect to employees’ perceptions about
the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis. Findings from this study are beneficial not
only to the public policy and administration field, but to a wide array of other fields,
including the fields of psychology and intelligence. The findings from the study are also
applicable to many agencies and organizations, to include the DOD and the coalition of
17 agencies and organizations that are a part of the U.S. Intelligence Community
including the ODNI, Army Intelligence, FBI, and CIA.
Conclusion
This study was undertaken in order to determine whether there was a perceived
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were
subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have
not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. Findings indicated
a significant difference in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be
randomly administered at work by group. In addition, findings indicated a significant
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difference in the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security
compromises by group. In contrast, findings indicated no significant difference in the
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a
condition of employment by group.
Malicious insider threats pose a serious threat to organizations (Jenkins, 2013).
Polygraph analysis is used as a deterrence to keep potential employees out of sensitive
positions and keep current employees who are in sensitive positions from engaging in
wrongdoing (American Polygraph Association, 2002; Jenkins, 2013; National Research
Council, 2003; ODNI, 2012). Based on the findings, national security agencies should
continue their enforcement of polygraph examinations that are required of certain
security personnel. In addition, they should seek out other ways to expand polygraph
analysis in order to strengthen the national intelligence infrastructure. This could include
using a multifaceted approach that would include the use of polygraph testing in
conjunction with other mitigation strategies and detection techniques, as well as other
screening or investigative information (American Polygraph Association, 2005; Jenkins,
2013; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Vance & Siponen, 2012).
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Appendix A: Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
You are invited to take part in a research study of Polygraph Deterrence. The researcher
is inviting individuals in the following categories:
a. Who have taken a screening polygraph within the last year AND are currently in a
position that may require a polygraph test. Being in a position that requires a polygraph is
identified by signing a statement of understanding that a person may be required to take a
polygraph in the future as part of their job.
b. Who have NOT taken a screening polygraph within the last year and are NOT in a
position that may require a polygraph as a condition of employment.
This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to understand this
study before deciding whether to take part.
This study is being conducted by Joshua Cook, a doctoral candidate at Walden
University. You may already know or have met Mr. Cook during the course of your
work. This study is not related to his current job and your participation in the survey will
have no impact on your relationship with Mr. Cook. This study is wholly separate from
his role in his current job.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to determine deterrence effects of a screening polygraph
examination.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:
• Complete a questionnaire along with a brief statement on your polygraph
experience. The questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes.
Here are some sample questions:
1. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a random polygraph.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree
5
4
3
2
1
2. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a mandatory polygraph
exam.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree
5
4
3
2
1
3. Random polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree
5
4
3
2
1
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Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is strictly voluntary. Mr. Cook will be the only researcher involved in this
study and he will respect your decision of whether or not you choose to be in the study.
No one in the polygraph community will treat you differently if you decline to participate
in the study. This study will NOT impact your occupation in the future and it WILL NOT
impact your ability to receive a screening polygraph in the future. If you decide to join
the study now, you can still change your mind during or after the study. You may stop at
any time. The survey is completely anonymous.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study involves some minor risk of discomfort, similar to what would
be experienced in daily life. An example would be recalling an unpleasant experience
during a polygraph examination or being asked to choose between whether or not you
agree or disagree with certain policies related to polygraph employment. Being in this
study will NOT pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.
The study is likely beneficial because it will assist in determining the impact having a
screening polygraph program is for programs that use a polygraph to protect its
proprietary or restricted information. It will also help determine how effective the policy
in place is and will help provide a quantitative justification for continuation or change in
the polygraph policy currently in place.
Payment:
There will be no payment offered for your voluntary participation.
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be kept confidential and will not be used in any
government function. This study is NOT part of any government activity. All surveys
will be anonymous and the data collected from the survey will be encrypted and
maintained for 5 years, as required by the University. Mr. Cook will not use your
information for any other purposes outside the study. He will also remove any identifying
information from any information that may indicate the author of a particular survey.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher via email at Joshua.cook @ waldenu.edu. If you want to talk
privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 1800-925-3368, extension 1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is
08-13-14-0118381 and it expires on August 12, 2015.
You may print a copy of this questionnaire for your records.
Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a
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decision about my involvement. Completing the web link survey indicates I voluntarily
consented to the terms described above I understand that I am agreeing to the terms
described above.
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Appendix B: Questionnaire
Questionnaire
a. Have you taken a screening polygraph examination in the past 1 year? (Yes, see
question b) (No, see question c).
b. Approximately when did you take your polygraph exam? (Month/Year)
c. Does your current employment position require you to take a polygraph as a condition
of employment? (e.g., you have signed a form stating you might be required to take a
polygraph as a condition of employment) (if yes, participant is not eligible. If no,
participant is part of no polygraph-treatment group).
d. Are you 18 years old or older (Y/N) What is the month/year of birth?
e. Are you a U.S. person (green card holder/U.S. Citizen) (Y/N).
Survey Definitions
DISCLAIMER: For the purposes of the research, it is assumed that a perception of the
polygraph is based on the need to take the polygraph as part of a person’s employment.
Therefore, the definitions of mandatory and random may not be consistent with the
definitions used in actual polygraph programs.
Screening Polygraph: A screening polygraph exam is a generic polygraph examination
with broad questions. The screening polygraph exam is non-accusatory and is not
prompted by any specific incident or accusation.
Mandatory Polygraph: A polygraph test that is taken on a predictable regular basis,
typically conducted on a 5 year basis and called a periodic polygraph test.
Random Polygraph: A polygraph test that is taken on an unpredictable basis. An example
of a random polygraph would be a polygraph taken at 12 months within the start of
employment, then within 3 years of the last test, then 2 years later. Generally a random
polygraph is not conducted in a predictable manner. Random polygraph exams can also
be considered aperiodic tests.
Security: Related to the individual responsibilities regarding protection and proper
storage of proprietary or classified national defense information. The information is
something an organization desires to hold close in order to protect organizational
information, trade secrets, national defense information, etc. It is directly related to
adherence of proper procedures in order to protect the information and prevent
inadvertent or deliberate disclosures to unauthorized personnel.
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Espionage: The providing of sensitive information to a competing power regarding
organizational information, trade secrets or national defense information by a willing
individual in order to give a potential advantage to the competing power. The providing
of the sensitive information is often accompanied by reward to the provider of the
information, which comes in the form of personal gain.
Leaks: The unauthorized provision of sensitive information to members of the media,
often done to damage the reputation of a party privy to the information or to gain an
advantage in certain negotiations.
Security program: A series of regulations and rules administered by a group of
individuals with power to enforce and recommend sanctions for failure to adhere to
regulations and rules. The purpose of the program is to protect sensitive organizational
information, and to maintain an organization’s competitive edge when dealing with
competing organizations.
Deliberate security compromises: The deliberate violation of a security directive or rule,
designed to protect a company’s information and maintain its competitive edge.
Survey
1. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

2. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a MANDATORY
polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

3. RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

4. MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

5. MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
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Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

6. RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

7. I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam on security regulations.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

8. I adhere more closely to security regulation because I am subjected to a
MANDATORY polygraph exam on security regulations.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

9. I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

10. I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a
MANDATORY polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

11. Security will be enhanced if more people were subjected to a RANDOM polygraph
exam
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

12. Security will be enhanced if more people were subjected to a MANDATORY
polygraph exam
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1
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13. More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the Department of
Defense.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

14. Those subjected to MANDATORY polygraph exams adhere more closely to the
security regulations.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

15. Those subjected to RANDOM polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security
regulations.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

16. RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

17. MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

18. Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

19. A MANDATORY polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

20. A RANDOM polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1
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(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) -Taking a polygraph
examination is an enjoyable experience.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

21. People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

22. People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a MANDATORY
polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

23. People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a RANDOM
polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

24. MANDATORY polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

25. RANDOM polygraph exams can enhance workplace security.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

26. I would commit a security violation even if I was subjected to a polygraph exam.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) -The results of a polygraph
should not be used when making a security decision.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

136
27. RANDOM polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified information.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

28. MANDATORY polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified
information.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) Information on RANDOM
polygraph examinations should be excluded from MANDATORY Threat Awareness
briefings.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) A deliberate security
compromise is OK.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

29. I am willing to take a RANDOM polygraph exam as part of a security program.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1

30. I am willing to take a MANDATORY polygraph exam in order to enhance a security
program.
Strongly agree
5

Agree
4

Neutral/No Opinion Disagree
3
2

Strongly disagree
1
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Appendix C: Survey Factor 1 and 3 t Test and Significance
An independent samples t test was conducted to assess if there were differences in
Factor 1 by group (taken polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no) (alpha = .95). Prior to
analysis, the assumption of normality was assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result
of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of normality; however, the t
test is robust to violations of normality (Howell, 2012). The assumption of equality of
variance was assessed using Levene's test. The result of the test was significant, p = .036,
violating the assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which
does not assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).
The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(324) = -5.21, p <
.001, suggesting that there was a difference on Factor 1 by group. Participants who had
not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who
had taken a polygraph in the past year. According to Cohen (1988), the difference
between the two groups was a medium effect size. Results of the independent sample t
test are presented in Table 1.
Table A1
Independent Sample t Test for Factor 1 by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No)
No
Variable

t(324)

p

d

Factor 1

-5.21

.001

0.58

M

Yes
SD

M

SD

3.60 0.83 4.05 0.71
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An independent samples t test was conducted to assess if there were differences in
Factor 3 group (taken polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no;alpha = .89). Prior to
analysis, the assumption of normality was assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result
of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of normality; however, the
t-test is robust to violations of normality (Howell, 2010). The assumption of equality of
variance was assessed using Levene's test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001,
violating the assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which
does not assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).
The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(313) = -9.04, p <
.001, suggesting that there was a difference in Factor 3 by group. Participants who had
not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who
had taken a polygraph in the past year. According to Cohen (1988), the difference
between the two groups was a large effect size. Results of the independent sample t test
are presented in Table 2.
Table A2
Independent Sample t Test for Factor 3 by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No)
No
Variable

t(313)

p

d

Factor 3

-9.04

.001

0.99

M

Yes
SD

M

SD

3.52 0.70 4.13 0.51
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Appendix D: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables Combined
Variables
Question 1
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 2
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 3
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 4
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 5
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 6
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree

n

%

151
46
51
70
8

46
14
16
21
2

121
54
50
90
11

37
17
15
28
3

165
31
44
79
7

51
10
13
24
2

145
47
57
69
8

44
14
17
21
2

153
43
45
75
10

47
13
14
23
3

166
33
42
77
8

51
10
13
24
2
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Question 7
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 8
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 9
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 10
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 11
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 12
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 13
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion

55
53
146
37
35

17
16
45
11
11

60
50
140
43
33

18
15
43
13
10

111
65
69
56
25

34
20
21
17
8

105
69
70
57
25

32
21
21
17
8

169
33
52
68
4

52
10
16
21
1

153
39
65
63
6

47
12
20
19
2

154
32
59

47
10
18
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Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 14
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 15
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 16
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 17
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 18
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 19
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 20
Agree

74
7

23
2

139
35
83
61
8

43
11
25
19
2

152
38
68
62
6

47
12
21
19
2

167
36
43
74
6

51
11
13
23
2

163
39
49
70
5

50
12
15
21
2

137
33
51
96
9

42
10
16
29
3

176
32
48
63
7

54
10
15
19
2

171

52
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Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 21
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 22
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 23
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 24
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 25
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 26
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree

30
47
72
6

9
14
22
2

33
93
140
9
51

10
29
43
3
16

119
16
31
153
7

37
5
10
47
2

111
20
48
138
9

34
6
15
42
3

120
25
44
128
9

37
8
13
39
3

153
29
79
58
7

47
9
24
18
2

156
31
58
75
6

48
10
18
23
2

143
Question 27
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 28
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 29
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 30
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 31
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 32
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 33
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion

16
77
33
4
196

5
24
10
1
60

53
136
87
11
39

16
42
27
3
12

163
41
49
67
6

50
13
15
21
2

156
44
59
63
4

48
13
18
19
1

62
95
129
14
26

19
29
40
4
8

12
50
21
2
241

4
15
6
1
74

154
16
36

47
5
11

144
Strongly agree
107
Strongly disagree
13
Question 34
Agree
143
Disagree
20
Neutral / No Opinion
31
Strongly agree
117
Strongly disagree
15
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100.

33
4
44
6
10
36
5
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Appendix E: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables Yes polygraph
Variables
Question 1
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 2
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 3
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 4
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 5
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 6
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 7

n

%

70
8
25
46
3

46
5
16
30
2

58
6
20
66
2

38
4
13
43
1

71
5
18
57
1

47
3
12
38
1

75
4
21
51
1

49
3
14
34
1

72
3
19
55
3

47
2
13
36
2

70
5
19
56
2

46
3
13
37
1
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Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 8
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 9
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 10
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 11
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 12
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 13
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree

32
31
51
26
12

21
20
34
17
8

36
27
45
32
12

24
18
30
21
8

37
29
46
30
10

24
19
30
20
7

42
30
43
27
10

28
20
28
18
7

71
8
26
46
1

47
5
17
30
1

76
7
27
40
2

50
5
18
26
1

69
8
27
47

45
5
18
31
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Strongly disagree
Question 14
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 15
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 16
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 17
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 18
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 19
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 20
Agree
Disagree

1

1

67
12
36
35
2

44
8
24
23
1

64
14
37
36
1

42
9
24
24
1

72
9
22
48
1

47
6
14
32
1

77
9
19
46
1

51
6
13
30
1

62
3
14
72
1

41
2
9
47
1

88
3
16
44
1

58
2
11
29
1

76
5

50
3
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Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 21
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 22
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 23
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 24
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 25
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 26
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 27

20
50
1

13
33
1

27
45
58
8
14

18
30
38
5
9

51
1
8
90
2

34
1
5
59
1

49
3
12
86
2

32
2
8
57
1

49
5
20
75
3

32
3
13
49
2

76
4
31
40
1

50
3
20
26
1

70
6
27
48
1

46
4
18
32
1
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Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 28
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 29
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 30
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 31
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 32
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly disagree
Question 33
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree

7
26
10
2
107

5
17
7
1
70

13
71
44
3
21

9
47
29
2
14

76
9
22
44
1

50
6
14
29
1

72
8
26
45
1

47
5
17
30
1

24
48
55
10
15

16
32
36
7
10

4
13
2
133

3
9
1
88

70
2
7
70
3

46
1
5
46
2
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Question 34
Agree
65
Disagree
2
Neutral / No Opinion
3
Strongly agree
80
Strongly disagree
2
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100.

43
1
2
53
1
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Appendix F: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables No Polygraph Group
Variables
Question 1
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 2
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 3
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 4
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 5
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 6
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree

n

%

81
38
26
24
5

47
22
15
14
3

63
48
30
24
9

36
28
17
14
5

94
26
26
22
6

54
15
15
13
3

70
43
36
18
7

40
25
21
10
4

81
40
26
20
7

47
23
15
11
4

96
28
23
21
6

55
16
13
12
3
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Question 7
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 8
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 9
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 10
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 11
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 12
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 13
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion

23
22
95
11
23

13
13
55
6
13

24
23
95
11
21

14
13
55
6
12

74
36
23
26
15

43
21
13
15
9

63
39
27
30
15

36
22
16
17
9

98
25
26
22
3

56
14
15
13
2

77
32
38
23
4

44
18
22
13
2

85
24
32

49
14
18
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Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 14
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 15
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 16
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 17
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 18
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 19
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 20
Agree

27
6

16
3

72
23
47
26
6

41
13
27
15
3

88
24
31
26
5

51
14
18
15
3

95
27
21
26
5

55
16
12
15
3

86
30
30
24
4

49
17
17
14
2

75
30
37
24
8

43
17
21
14
5

88
29
32
19
6

51
17
18
11
3

95

55
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Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 21
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 22
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 23
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 24
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 25
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 26
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree

25
27
22
5

14
16
13
3

6
48
82
1
37

3
28
47
1
21

68
15
23
63
5

39
9
13
36
3

62
17
36
52
7

36
10
21
30
4

71
20
24
53
6

41
11
14
30
3

77
25
48
18
6

44
14
28
10
3

86
25
31
27
5

49
14
18
16
3
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Question 27
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 28
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 29
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 30
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 31
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 32
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Question 33
Agree
Disagree
Neutral / No Opinion

9
51
23
2
89

5
29
13
1
51

40
65
43
8
18

23
37
25
5
10

87
32
27
23
5

50
18
16
13
3

84
36
33
18
3

48
21
19
10
2

38
47
74
4
11

22
27
43
2
6

8
37
19
2
108

5
21
11
1
62

84
14
29

48
8
17
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Strongly agree
37
Strongly disagree
10
Question 34
Agree
78
Disagree
18
Neutral / No Opinion
28
Strongly agree
37
Strongly disagree
13
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100.

21
6
45
10
16
21
7

